Everett Animal Abuse

 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

WASHINGTON RCW'S

RCW 3.66.020(2) Civil Jurisdiction Actions for damages for injuries to the person, or for taking or detaining personal property, or for injuring personal property, or for an injury to real property when no issue raised by the answer involves the plaintiff's title to or possession of the same and actions to recover the possession of personal property;

RCW 9.01.120 Civil remedies preserved. The omission to specify or affirm in this act any liability to any damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy, imposed by law, and allowed to be recovered or enforced in any civil action or proceeding, for any act or omission declared punishable herein, shall not affect any right to recover or enforce the same.

RCW 9.05.060(1)(2) Criminal sabotage defined — Penalty. Whoever, with intent that his or her act shall, or with reason to believe that it may, injure, interfere with, interrupt, supplant, nullify, impair, or obstruct the owner's or operator's management, operation, or control of any agricultural, stockraising, lumbering, mining, quarrying, fishing, manufacturing, transportation, mercantile, or building enterprise, or any other public or private business or commercial enterprise, wherein any person is employed for wage, shall willfully damage or destroy, or attempt or threaten to damage or destroy, any property whatsoever, or shall unlawfully take or retain, or attempt or threaten unlawfully to take or retain, possession or control of any property, instrumentality, machine, mechanism, or appliance used in such business or enterprise, shall be guilty of criminal sabotage. (2)Criminal sabotage is a class B felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW.

RCW 9.08.070 (1) Pet animals - Taking, concealing, injuring, killing, etc. - Penalty. Any person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof, does any of the following shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW and by a mandatory fine of not less than five hundred dollars per pet animal, except as provided by subsection (2) of this section: (a) Takes, leads away, confines, secretes or converts any pet animal, except in cases in which the value of the pet animal exceeds two hundred fifty dollars; (b) Conceals the identity of any pet animal or its owner by obscuring, altering, or removing from the pet animal any collar, tag, license, tattoo, or other identifying device or mark; (c) Willfully or recklessly kills or injures any pet animal, unless excused by law.

RCW 9.08.070 (2) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a person from also being convicted of separate offenses under , 9A.56.040, or 9A.56.050 for theft or under RCW 9A.56.150, 9A.56.160, or 9A.56.170 for possession of stolen property. [2003 c 53 § 9; 1989 c 359 § 2; 1982 c 114 § 1.] Notes: Intent -- Effective date -- 2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180. Application of Consumer Protection Act: RCW 19.86.145 RCW 18.92

RCW 9.62.010(1)(2) Malicious prosecution. Every person who shall, maliciously and without probable cause therefor, cause or attempt to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against for any crime of which he or she is innocent: (1) If such crime be a felony, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years; and (2) If such crime be a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

RCW 9.91.010 Denial of civil rights Terms defined. (b) "Deny" is hereby defined to include any act which directly or indirectly, or by subterfuge, by a person or his agent or employee, results or is intended or calculated to result in whole or in part in any discrimination, distinction, restriction, or unequal treatment,

RCW 9.91.170 Interfering with dog guide or service animal. (1)(a) Any person who has received notice that his or her behavior is interfering with the use of a dog guide or service animal who continues with reckless disregard to interfere with the use of a dog guide or service animal by obstructing, intimidating, or otherwise jeopardizing the safety of the dog guide or service animal user or his or her dog guide or service animal is guilty of a misdemeanor, except as provided in (b) of this subsection. (b) A second or subsequent violation of this subsection is a gross misdemeanor. (2)(a) Any person who, with reckless disregard, allows his or her dog to interfere with the use of a dog guide or service animal by obstructing, intimidating, or otherwise jeopardizing the safety of the dog guide or service animal user or his or her dog guide or service animal is guilty of a misdemeanor, except as provided in (b) of this subsection. (b) A second or subsequent violation of this subsection is a gross misdemeanor. (3) Any person who, with reckless disregard, injures, disables, or causes the death of a dog guide or service animal is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. (4) Any person who, with reckless disregard, allows his or her dog to injure, disable, or cause the death of a dog guide or service animal is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. (5) Any person who intentionally injures, disables, or causes the death of a dog guide or service animal is guilty of a class C felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW. (6) Any person who wrongfully obtains or exerts unauthorized control over a dog guide or service animal with the intent to deprive the dog guide or service animal user of his or her dog guide or service animal is guilty of theft in the first degree, RCW 9A.56.030. (7)(a) In any case in which the defendant is convicted of a violation of this section, he or she shall also be ordered to make full restitution for all damages, including incidental and consequential expenses incurred by the dog guide or service animal user and the dog guide or service animal which arise out of or are related to the criminal offense. (b) Restitution for a conviction under this section shall include, but is not limited to: (i) The value of the replacement of an incapacitated or deceased dog guide or service animal, the training of a replacement dog guide or service animal, or retraining of the affected dog guide or service animal and all related veterinary and care expenses; and (ii) Medical expenses of the dog guide or service animal user, training of the dog guide or service animal user, and compensation for wages or earned income lost by the dog guide or service animal user. (8) Nothing in this section shall affect any civil remedies available for violation of this section. For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply: (a) "Dog guide" means a dog that is trained for the purpose of guiding blind persons or a dog trained for the purpose of assisting hearing impaired persons. (b) "Service animal" means an animal that is trained for the purposes of assisting or accommodating a disabled person's sensory, mental, or physical disability. (c) "Notice" means a verbal or otherwise communicated warning prescribing the behavior of another person and a request that the person stop their behavior. (d) "Value" means the value to the dog guide or service animal user and does not refer to cost or fair market value.

RCW 9.95.062 Stay of judgment When prohibited Credit for jail time pending appeal. (1) Notwithstanding CrR 3.2 or RAP 7.2, an appeal by a defendant in a criminal action shall not stay the execution of the judgment of conviction, if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) The defendant is likely to flee or to pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if the judgment is stayed; or

(b) The delay resulting from the stay will unduly diminish the deterrent effect of the punishment; or (c) A stay of the judgment will cause unreasonable trauma to the victims of the crime or their families; or (d) The defendant has not undertaken to the extent of the defendant's financial ability to pay the financial obligations under the judgment or has not posted an adequate performance bond to assure payment.

RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a)(b)(c)(d) General requirements of culpability.(1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.(a) INTENT. A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime. (b) KNOWLEDGE. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when: (i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or (ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense. (c) RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. (d) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.

RCW 9A.08.010(2) Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness, and Knowledge. When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

RCW 9A.08.010(3) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.

RCW 9A.08.010(4) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears.

RCW 9A.08.020(1) Liability for conduct of another Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he or she is legally accountable.

RCW 9A.08.020(2)(a)(b)(c) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) He or she is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the crime; or (c) He or she is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime.

RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(b) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she: (i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (b) His or her conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his or her complicity.

RCW 9A.08.020(6) A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on proof of the commission of the crime and of his or her complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.

RCW 9A.20(2) Classification and designation of crimes. Misdemeanors and Gross Misdemeanors. (a) Any crime punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment is a misdemeanor. Whenever the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed, the committing of such act shall be a misdemeanor.

RCW 9A.36.078 Malicious harassment Finding. The legislature finds that crimes and threats against persons because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicaps are serious and increasing. The legislature also finds that crimes and threats are often directed against interracial couples and their children or couples of mixed religions, colors, ancestries, or national origins because of bias and bigotry against the race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin of one person in the couple or family. The legislature finds that the state interest in preventing crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias goes beyond the state interest in preventing other felonies or misdemeanors such as criminal trespass, malicious mischief, assault, or other crimes that are not motivated by hatred, bigotry, and bias, and that prosecution of those other crimes inadequately protects citizens from crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias. Therefore, the legislature finds that protection of those citizens from threats of harm due to bias and bigotry is a compelling state interest.
The legislature also finds that in many cases, certain discrete words or symbols are used to threaten the victims. Those discrete words or symbols have historically or traditionally been used to connote hatred or threats towards members of the class of which the victim or a member of the victim's family or household is a member. In particular, the legislature finds that cross burnings historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass African Americans and their families. Cross burnings often preceded lynchings, murders, burning of homes, and other acts of terror. Further, Nazi swastikas historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass Jewish people and their families. Swastikas symbolize the massive destruction of the Jewish population, commonly known as the holocaust. Therefore, the legislature finds that any person who burns or attempts to burn a cross or displays a swastika on the property of the victim or burns a cross or displays a swastika as part of a series of acts directed towards a particular person, the person's family or household members, or a particular group, knows or reasonably should know that the cross burning or swastika may create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the person, the person's family and household members, or the group.
The legislature also finds that a hate crime committed against a victim because of the victim's gender may be identified in the same manner that a hate crime committed against a victim of another protected group is identified. Affirmative indications of hatred towards gender as a class is the predominant factor to consider. Other factors to consider include the perpetrator's use of language, slurs, or symbols expressing hatred towards the victim's gender as a class; the severity of the attack including mutilation of the victim's sexual organs; a history of similar attacks against victims of the same gender by the perpetrator or a history of similar incidents in the same area; a lack of provocation; an absence of any other apparent motivation; and common sense.

RCW 9A.36.080(1)(2)(3)(4)(7)(8)(9) Malicious harassment — Definition and criminal penalty. (1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap: (b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or (2)In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap if the person commits one of the following acts: This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection. (3)It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap. (4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness. (b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:n (i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person. (7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony. (8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law. (9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington. Harassment: Chapters 9A.46 and 10.14 RCW.

RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii)(iii)(iv)(b) Definition - Penalties.(1) A person is guilty of harassment if: (a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly threatens: (i) To cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (ii) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or (iii) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or (iv) Maliciously to do any other act which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened or another with respect to his or her physical or mental health or safety; and (b) The person by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. "Words or conduct" includes, in addition to any other form of communication or conduct, the sending of an electronic communication.

RCW 9A.46.020(2)(a)(b) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, a person who harasses another is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. (b) A person who harasses another is guilty of a class C felony if any of the following apply: (i) The person has previously been convicted in this or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a no-contact or no-harassment order; (ii) the person harasses another person under subsection (1)(a)(i) of this section by threatening to kill the person threatened or any other person; (iii) the person harasses a criminal justice participant who is performing his or her official duties at the time the threat is made; or (iv) the person harasses a criminal justice participant because of an action taken or decision made by the criminal justice participant during the performance of his or her official duties. For the purposes of (b)(iii) and (iv) of this subsection, the fear from the threat must be a fear that a reasonable criminal justice participant would have under all the circumstances. Threatening words do not constitute harassment if it is apparent to the criminal justice participant that the person does not have the present and future ability to carry out the threat.

RCW 9A.46.020(3) Any criminal justice participant who is a target for threats or harassment prohibited under subsection (2)(b)(iii) or (iv) of this section, and any family members residing with him or her, shall be eligible for the address confidentiality program created under RCW 40.24.030.

RCW 9A.46.020(4) For purposes of this section, a criminal justice participant includes any (a) federal, state, or local law enforcement agency employee; (b) federal, state, or local prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney; (c) staff member of any adult corrections institution or local adult detention facility; (d) staff member of any juvenile corrections institution or local juvenile detention facility; (e) community corrections officer, probation, or parole officer; (f) member of the indeterminate sentence review board; (g) advocate from a crime victim/witness program; or (h) defense attorney.

RCW 9A.46(5) The penalties provided in this section for harassment do not preclude the victim from seeking any other remedy otherwise available under law

RCW 9A.56.030 Theft in the first degree(1) A person is guilty of theft in the first degree if he or she commits theft of: (a) Property or services which exceed(s) five thousand dollars in value other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010;

RCW 9A.56.040 Theft in the second degree (1) A person is guilty of theft in the second degree if he or she commits theft of: (a) Property or services which exceed(s) seven hundred fifty dollars in value but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle; or (b) A public record, writing, or instrument kept, filed, or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or

RCW 9A.56.050 Theft in the 3^rd degree (1) A person is guilty of theft in the third degree if he or she commits theft of property or services which (a) does not exceed seven hundred fifty dollars in value,

RCW 9A.56.080 Theft of livestock in the first degree.(1) Every person who, with intent to sell or exchange and to deprive or defraud the lawful owner thereof, willfully takes, leads, or transports away, conceals, withholds, slaughters, or otherwise appropriates any horse, mule, cow, heifer, bull, steer, swine, goat, or sheep is guilty of theft of livestock in the first degree.

RCW 9A.56.083 Theft of livestock in the second degree. (1) A person who commits what would otherwise be theft of livestock in the first degree but without intent to sell or exchange, and for the person's own use only, is guilty of theft of livestock in the second degree.

RCW 9A.56.085 Minimum fine for theft of livestock. (1) Whenever a person is convicted of a violation of RCW 9A.56.080 or 9A.56.083, the convicting court shall order the person to pay the amount of two thousand dollars for each animal killed or possessed. (2) For the purpose of this section, the term "convicted" includes a plea of guilty, a finding of guilt regardless of whether the imposition of the sentence is deferred or any part of the penalty is suspended, or the levying of a fine. (3) If two or more persons are convicted of any violation of this section, the amount required under this section shall be imposed upon them jointly and severally. (4) The fine in this section shall be imposed in addition to and regardless of any penalty, including fines or costs, that is provided for any violation of this section. The amount imposed by this section shall be included by the court in any pronouncement of sentence and may not be suspended, waived, modified, or deferred in any respect. Nothing in this section may be construed to abridge or alter alternative rights of action or remedies in equity or under common law or statutory law, criminal or civil. (5) A defaulted payment or any installment payment may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of orders of the court or collection of a fine or costs, including vacation of a deferral of sentencing or of a suspension of sentence. (6) The two thousand dollars additional penalty shall be remitted by the county treasurer to the state treasurer as provided under RCW 10.82.070.

RCW 9A.56.130 Extortion in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25) (d) through (j). (2) In any prosecution under this section based on a threat to accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person, it is a defense that the actor reasonably believed the threatened criminal charge to be true and that his or her sole purpose was to compel or induce the person threatened to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened criminal charge.

RCW 9A.72.080 Statement of what one does not know to be true. Every unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which he or she knows to be false.

RCW 9A.80.010 Official misconduct. (1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege: (a) He or she intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or

RCW 9A.84.040 False reporting.A person is guilty of false reporting if with knowledge that the information reported, conveyed, or circulated is false, he or she initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe, or emergency knowing that such false report is likely to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or transportation facility, or to cause public inconvenience or alarm. (2) False reporting is a gross misdemeanor.

RCW 10.14.020(1) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. "Course of conduct" includes, in addition to any other form of communication, contact, or conduct, the sending of an electronic communication, but does not include constitutionally protected free speech. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of conduct."

RCW 10.14.020(2) "Unlawful harassment" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or, when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child.

RCW 16.52 Washington State Animal Abuse and Neglect Statutes

RCW 16.52.085(4)(a)(b)(c) The agency having custody of the animal may euthanize the animal or may find a responsible person to adopt the animal not less than fifteen business days after the animal is taken into custody. A custodial agency may euthanize severely injured, diseased, or suffering animals at any time. An owner may prevent the animal's destruction or adoption by: (a) Petitioning the district court of the county where the animal was seized for the animal's immediate return subject to court-imposed conditions, or (b) posting a bond or security in an amount sufficient to provide for the animal's care for a minimum of thirty days from the seizure date.

RCW 16.52.085(3) Notice requirements after removal of personal property by authorities is provided in paragraph (3). After removal of animals, notice must be provided by posting, personal service or certified mail and the owner must be provided written notice of the reasons for removal in this notice and legal remedies available to the owner.

RCW 16.52.207(1)(2)(a)(b)(c)(3) Animal cruelty in the second degree - Penalty. (1) A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal. (2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence (a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure; (b) Under circumstances not amounting to animal cruelty in the second degree under (c) of this subsection, abandons the animal; or (c) Abandons the animal and (i) as a result of being abandoned, the animal suffers bodily harm; or (ii) abandoning the animal creates an imminent and substantial risk that the animal will suffer substantial bodily harm. (3) Animal cruelty in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.

RCW 16.52.207(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's control.

RCW 16.52.210 Destruction of animal by law enforcement officer - Immunity from liability. This chapter shall not limit the right of a law enforcement officer to destroy an animal that has been seriously injured and would otherwise continue to suffer. Such action shall be undertaken with reasonable prudence and, whenever possible, in consultation with a licensed veterinarian and the owner of the animal. Law enforcement officers and licensed veterinarians shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for actions taken under this chapter if reasonable prudence is exercised in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.

RCW 16.52.310(d) Provide dogs with easy and convenient access to adequate amounts of clean food and water.

RCW 18.92.013 Dispensing of drugs by registered or licensed personnel. (1) A veterinarian legally prescribing drugs may delegate to a registered veterinary medication clerk, while under the veterinarian's direct supervision, certain nondiscretionary functions defined by the board and used in the preparing of legend and nonlegend drugs (except controlled substances as defined in or under chapter 69.50 RCW) associated with the practice of veterinary medicine. A veterinarian legally prescribing drugs may delegate to a licensed veterinary technician, while under the veterinarian's indirect supervision, certain nondiscretionary functions defined by the board and used in the preparing of legend drugs, nonlegend drugs, and controlled substances associated with the practice of veterinary medicine. Upon final approval of the packaged prescription following a direct physical inspection of the packaged prescription for proper formulation, packaging, and labeling by the veterinarian, the veterinarian may delegate the delivery of the prescription to a registered veterinary medication clerk or licensed veterinary technician, while under the veterinarian's indirect supervision. Dispensing of drugs by veterinarians, licensed veterinary technicians, and registered veterinary medication clerks shall meet the applicable requirements of chapters 18.64, 69.40, 69.41, and 69.50 RCW and is subject to inspection by the board of pharmacy investigators.

RCW 35.01.010 First-class city A first-class city is a city with a population of ten thousand or more at the time of its organization or reorganization that has a charter adopted under Article XI, section 10, of the state Constitution.

RCW 35.22.010 Laws governing. Cities of the first class shall be organized and governed according to the law providing for the government of cities having a population of ten thousand or more inhabitants that have adopted a charter in accordance with Article XI, section 10 of the state Constitution.

RCW 35.27.370 (1) Specific powers enumerated Citation: WA ST Citation: West's RCWA 35.27.370 This Washington statute provides that the council of said town shall have power to pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States. Specifically, the council may regulate, restrain, or prohibit the running at large of any and all domestic animals within the city limits, or any part or parts thereof, and to regulate the keeping of such animals within any part of the city; to establish, maintain and regulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, who shall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed on, and collected from, the owners of any impounded stock. Statute in Full: The council of said town shall have power: (1) To pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States;

RCW 35.27.370(16) To make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, as may be deemed expedient to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the town and its trade, commerce and manufacturers, and to do and perform any and all other acts and things necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

RCW 40.16.030 Offering false instrument for filing or record. Every person who shall knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered or recorded in such office under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both.

RCW 42.20.040 False report. Every public officer who shall knowingly make any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement, under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

RCW 42.20.050 Public officer making false certificate. Every public officer who, being authorized by law to make or give a certificate or other writing, shall knowingly make and deliver as true such a certificate or writing containing any statement which he knows to be false, in a case where the punishment thereof is not expressly prescribed by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

RCW 42.52.020 Activities incompatible with public duties. No state officer or state employee may have an interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, or engage in a business or transaction or professional activity, or incur an obligation of any nature, that is in conflict with the proper discharge of the state officer’s or state employee’s official duties.

RCW 42.52.050(1) Confidential information--Improperly concealed records. (1) No state officer or state employee may accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity that the officer or employee might reasonably expect would require or induce him or her to make an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired by the official or employee by reason of the official's or employee's official position.

RCW42.52.050(2) No state officer or state employee may make a disclosure of confidential information gained by reason of the officer's or employee's official position or otherwise use the information for his or her personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of another, unless the disclosure has been authorized by statute or by the terms of a contract involving (a) the state officer's or state employee's agency and (b) the person or persons who have authority to waive the confidentiality of the information.

RCW 42.52.050(3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential information to any person not entitled or authorized to receive the information.

RCW 42.52.050 (4) (4) No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if the officer or employee knew the record was required to be released under chapter 42.17 RCW, was under a personal obligation to release the record, and failed to do so. This subsection does not apply where the decision to withhold the record was made in good faith. [1996 c 213 § 4; 1994 c 154 § 105.]

RCW 42.23.070(4) Prohibited acts. (4) No municipal officer may disclose confidential information gained by reason of the officer’s position, nor may the officer otherwise use such information for his or her personal gain or benefit.

RCW 49.44.010 Blacklisting — Penalty. Every person in this state who shall willfully and maliciously, send or deliver, or make or cause to be made, for the purpose of being delivered or sent or part with the possession of any paper, letter or writing, with or without name signed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, or with any letter, mark or other designation, or publish or cause to be published any statement for the purpose of preventing any other person from obtaining employment in this state or elsewhere, and every person who shall willfully and maliciously "blacklist" or cause to be "blacklisted" any person or persons, by writing, printing or publishing, or causing the same to be done, the name, or mark, or designation representing the name of any person in any paper, pamphlet, circular or book, together with any statement concerning persons so named, or publish or cause to be published that any person is a member of any secret organization, for the purpose of preventing such person from securing employment, or who shall willfully and maliciously make or issue any statement or paper that will tend to influence or prejudice the mind of any employer against the person of such person seeking employment, or any person who shall do any of the things mentioned in this section for the purpose of causing the discharge of any person employed by any railroad or other company, corporation, individual or individuals, shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than three hundred sixty-four days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. [2011 c 96 § 42; 1899 c 23 § 1; RRS § 7599.]

RCW 49.60.010 Purpose of chapter. This chapter shall be known as the "law against discrimination." It is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil rights. The legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. A state agency is herein created with powers with respect to elimination and prevention of discrimination in employment, in credit and insurance transactions, in places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, and in real property transactions because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and the commission established hereunder is hereby given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes.

RCW 49.60.030 (1) Freedom from discrimination — Declaration of civil rights.1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

RCW 49.60.030 (1)(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

RCW 49.60.030 (1)(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists. Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of this section shall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or implied agreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economic benefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by the laws of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person in order to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to exclude any person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or national origin or lawful business relationship: PROVIDED HOWEVER, That nothing herein contained shall prohibit the use of boycotts as authorized by law pertaining to labor disputes and unfair labor practices; and

RCW 49.60.030(2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 196r4 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).

RCW 49.60.400 Discrimination, preferential treatment prohibited. (1) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. (3) This section does not affect any law or governmental action that does not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin. (7) For the purposes of this section, "state" includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, public college or university, community college, school district, special district, or other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the state. (8) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available for violations of Washington antidiscrimination law.

RCW 69.50.505 Seizure and forfeiture. If any person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of items specified in subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section within forty-five days of the service of notice from the seizing agency in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right. The notice of claim may be served by any method authorized by law or court rule including, but not limited to, service by first-class mail. Service by mail shall be deemed complete upon mailing within the forty-five day period following service of the notice of seizure in the case of personal property and within the ninety-day period following service of the notice of seizure in the case of real property. The hearing shall be before the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or the chief law enforcement officer's designee, except where the seizing agency is a state agency as defined in RCW 34.12.020(4), the hearing shall be before the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or an administrative law judge appointed under chapter 34.12 RCW, except that any person asserting a claim or right may remove the matter to a court of competent jurisdiction. Removal of any matter involving personal property may only be accomplished according to the rules of civil procedure. The person seeking removal of the matter must serve process against the state, county, political subdivision, or municipality that operates the seizing agency, and any other party of interest, in accordance with RCW 4.28.080 or 4.92.020, within forty-five days after the person seeking removal has notified the seizing law enforcement agency of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession. The court to which the matter is to be removed shall be the district court when the aggregate value of personal property is within the jurisdictional limit set forth in RCW 3.66.020. A hearing before the seizing agency and any appeal therefrom shall be under Title 34 RCW. In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.

RCW 69.50.505(a)(2) Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claiming an interest in it then has 45 days to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e). Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property.

RCW 69.50.505(c) The seizing law enforcement agency shall promptly return the article or articles to the claimant upon a determination by the administrative law judge or court that the claimant is the present lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to possession thereof of items specified in subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section

WAC 246-15-020

EMC 6.04.070(2)
EMC 6.04.060
EMC 6.04.090(G)(1)(6)(7)
EMC 6.04.110(c)(10)
EMC 6.04.110(A)
EMC 6.04.110(B)
EMC 6.04.110(C)
EMC 6.04.110(D)
EMC 6.04.110(E)
EMC 6.04.110(f)
EMC 6.04.110(g)

FEDERAL LAWS

AIFRA Public Law No. 95-341 Public Law No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (Aug. 11, 1978) (commonly abbreviated to AIRFA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996, is a United States federal law and a joint resolution of Congress that was passed in 1978. It was enacted to protect and preserve the traditional religious rights and cultural practices of American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, and Native Hawaiians.[1] These rights include, but are not limited to, access of sacred sites, freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rights and use and possession of objects considered sacred. The Act required policies of all governmental agencies to eliminate interference with the free exercise of Native religion, based on the First Amendment, and to accommodate access to and use of religious sites to the extent that the use is practicable and is not inconsistent with an agency's essential functions. It also acknowledges the prior violation of that right Public Law 95-341 95th Congress

Joint Resolution American Indian Religious Freedom.

Whereas the freedom of religion for all people is an inherent right, fundamental to the democratic structure of the United States and is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; Whereas the United States has traditionally rejected the concept of a government denying individuals the right to practice their religion, and as a result, has benefited from a rich variety of religious heritages in this country; Whereas the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskan and Hawaiian) are an integral part of their culture, tradition, and heritage, such practices forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems; Whereas the traditional American Indian religions as an integral part of Indian life, are indispensable and irreplaceable; Whereas the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and consistent Federal policy has often resulted in the abridgment of religious freedom for traditional American Indians; Whereas such religious infringements result from the lack of knowledge of the insensitive and inflexible enforcement of Federal policies and regulations premised on a variety of laws; Whereas such laws were designed for such worthwhile purposes as conservation and preservation of natural species and resources but were never intended to relate to Indian religious practices and, there, were passed without consideration of their effect on traditional American Indian religions; Whereas such laws and policies often deny American Indians access to sacred sites required in their religions, including cemeteries; Whereas such laws at times prohibit the use and possession of sacred objects necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies; Whereas traditional American Indian ceremonies have been intruded upon, interfered with, and in a few instances banned;

Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of American in Congress Assembled, That henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.

SEC. 2. The President shall direct that various Federal departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities responsible for the administering relevant laws to evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with Native traditional religious leaders in order to determine appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American religious cultural rights and practices.

Title 42 USC §1966 Protection and preservation of traditional religions of Native Americans

Title 42 USC §3601 Declaration of Policy

Title 18 USC §88 (24) Bribery, Graft, And Conflicts Of Interest

Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq. United States Civil Rights Act of 196r4

Fed. R. Civ. P Supplemental Admiralty or Maritime Clams and Asset Forfieture Action Rules A(1)B

4^th Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures

5^th Amendment Right not to incriminate one's self

6^th Amendment Right to Counsel

7^th Amendment Right to a fair trial

8^th Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment

14^th Amendment Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship

S.372 The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act

Title 42 USC § 1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 93 > § 1905

§ 1905. Disclosure of confidential information generally

Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, any person acting on behalf of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, or agent of the Department of Justice as defined in the Antitrust Civil Process Act (15 U.S.C. 1311–1314), or being an employee of a private sector organization who is or was assigned to an agency under chapter 37 of title 5, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 93 > § 1918

§ 1918. Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the Government

Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 41 > § 873

§ 873. Blackmail

Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 3 > § 43

§ 43. Force, violence, and threats involving animal enterprises

(a) Offense.— Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce—

(1) for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise; and

(2) in connection with such purpose—

(A) intentionally damages or causes the loss of any real or personal property (including animals or records) used by an animal enterprise, or any real or personal property of a person or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise;

(B) intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person, a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115) of that person, or a spouse or intimate partner of that person by a course of conduct involving threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment, or intimidation; or

(C) conspires or attempts to do so;

shall be punished as provided for in subsection (b).

(b) Penalties.— The punishment for a violation of section [1] (a) or an attempt or conspiracy to violate subsection (a) shall be—

(1) a fine under this title or imprisonment not [2] more than 1 year, or both, if the offense does not instill in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death and—

(A) the offense results in no economic damage or bodily injury; or

(B) the offense results in economic damage that does not exceed $10,000;

(2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, if no bodily injury occurs and—

(A) the offense results in economic damage exceeding $10,000 but not exceeding $100,000; or

(B) the offense instills in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death;

(3) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, if—

(A) the offense results in economic damage exceeding $100,000; or

(B) the offense results in substantial bodily injury to another individual;

(4) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, if—

(A) the offense results in serious bodily injury to another individual; or

(B) the offense results in economic damage exceeding $1,000,000; and

(5) imprisonment for life or for any terms of years, a fine under this title, or both, if the offense results in death of another individual.

(c) Restitution.— An order of restitution under section 3663 or 3663A of this title with respect to a violation of this section may also include restitution—

(1) for the reasonable cost of repeating any experimentation that was interrupted or invalidated as a result of the offense;

(2) for the loss of food production or farm income reasonably attributable to the offense; and

(3) for any other economic damage, including any losses or costs caused by economic disruption, resulting from the offense.

(d) Definitions.— As used in this section—

(1) the term “animal enterprise” means—

(A) a commercial or academic enterprise that uses or sells animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber production, agriculture, education, research, or testing;

(B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet store, breeder, furrier, circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal event; or

(C) any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural arts and sciences;

(2) the term “course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose;

(3) the term “economic damage”—

(A) means the replacement costs of lost or damaged property or records, the costs of repeating an interrupted or invalidated experiment, the loss of profits, or increased costs, including losses and increased costs resulting from threats, acts or vandalism, property damage, trespass, harassment, or intimidation taken against a person or entity on account of that person’s or entity’s connection to, relationship with, or transactions with the animal enterprise; but

(B) does not include any lawful economic disruption (including a lawful boycott) that results from lawful public, governmental, or business reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal enterprise;

(4) the term “serious bodily injury” means—

(A) injury posing a substantial risk of death;

(B) extreme physical pain;

(C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or

(D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; and

(5) the term “substantial bodily injury” means—

(A) deep cuts and serious burns or abrasions;

(B) short-term or nonobvious disfigurement;

(C) fractured or dislocated bones, or torn members of the body;

(D) significant physical pain;

(E) illness;

(F) short-term loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or

(G) any other significant injury to the body.

(e) Rules of Construction.— Nothing in this section shall be construed—

(1) to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution;

(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution, regardless of the point of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal remedies for such interference; or

(3) to provide exclusive criminal penalties or civil remedies with respect to the conduct prohibited by this action, or to preempt State or local laws that may provide such penalties or remedies.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 13 > § 242

§ 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 13 > § 241

§ 241. Conspiracy against rights

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or

If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured—

They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 13 > § 245

§ 245. Federally protected activities

(a)

(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to prevent any State, any possession or Commonwealth of the United States, or the District of Columbia, from exercising jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section, nor shall anything in this section be construed as depriving State and local law enforcement authorities of responsibility for prosecuting acts that may be violations of this section and that are violations of State and local law. No prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the United States except upon the certification in writing of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General that in his judgment a prosecution by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice, which function of certification may not be delegated.

(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of Federal officers, or a Federal grand jury, to investigate possible violations of this section.

(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with—

(1) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from—

(A) voting or qualifying to vote, qualifying or campaigning as a candidate for elective office, or qualifying or acting as a poll watcher, or any legally authorized election official, in any primary, special, or general election;

(B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States;

(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any agency of the United States;

(D) serving, or attending upon any court in connection with possible service, as a grand or petit juror in any court of the United States;

(E) participating in or enjoying the benefits of any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance; or

(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been—

(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college;

(B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or activity provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof;

(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency of any State or subdivision thereof, or joining or using the services or advantages of any labor organization, hiring hall, or employment agency;

(D) serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with possible service, as a grand or petit juror;

(E) traveling in or using any facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehicle, terminal, or facility of any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air;

(F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves the public and which is principally engaged in selling food or beverages for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station, or of any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or any other place of exhibition or entertainment which serves the public, or of any other establishment which serves the public and

(i) which is located within the premises of any of the aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is physically located any of the aforesaid establishments, and

(ii) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such establishments; or

(3) during or incident to a riot or civil disorder, any person engaged in a business in commerce or affecting commerce, including, but not limited to, any person engaged in a business which sells or offers for sale to interstate travelers a substantial portion of the articles, commodities, or services which it sells or where a substantial portion of the articles or commodities which it sells or offers for sale have moved in commerce; or

(4) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from—

(A) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2)(A) through (2)(F); or

(B) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or protection to so participate; or

(5) any citizen because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such citizen or any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2)(A) through (2)(F), or participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportunity to so participate—

shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. As used in this section, the term “participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly” shall not mean the aiding, abetting, or inciting of other persons to riot or to commit any act of physical violence upon any individual or against any real or personal property in furtherance of a riot. Nothing in subparagraph (2)(F) or (4)(A) of this subsection shall apply to the proprietor of any establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, or to any employee acting on behalf of such proprietor, with respect to the enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such establishment if such establishment is located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor as his residence.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to deter any law enforcement officer from lawfully carrying out the duties of his office; and no law enforcement officer shall be considered to be in violation of this section for lawfully carrying out the duties of his office or lawfully enforcing ordinances and laws of the United States, the District of Columbia, any of the several States, or any political subdivision of a State. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term “law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States, the District of Columbia, a State, or political subdivision of a State, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of, or make arrests because of, offenses against the United States, the District of Columbia, a State, or a political subdivision of a State.

(d) For purposes of this section, the term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 13 > § 247

§ 247. Damage to religious property; obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs

(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances referred to in subsection (b) of this section—

(1) intentionally defaces, damages, or destroys any religious real property, because of the religious character of that property, or attempts to do so; or

(2) intentionally obstructs, by force or threat of force, any person in the enjoyment of that person’s free exercise of religious beliefs, or attempts to do so;

shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).

(b) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) Whoever intentionally defaces, damages, or destroys any religious real property because of the race, color, or ethnic characteristics of any individual associated with that religious property, or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).

(d) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be—

(1) if death results from acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, a fine in accordance with this title and imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death;

(2) if bodily injury results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this section, and the violation is by means of fire or an explosive, a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more that 40 years, or both;

(3) if bodily injury to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this section, results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, a fine in accordance with this title and imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both; and

(4) in any other case, a fine in accordance with this title and imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

(e) No prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the United States except upon the certification in writing of the Attorney General or his designee that in his judgment a prosecution by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice.

(f) As used in this section, the term “religious real property” means any church, synagogue, mosque, religious cemetery, or other religious real property, including fixtures or religious objects contained within a place of religious worship.

(g) No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any noncapital offense under this section unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 7 years after the date on which the offense was committed.

COURT RULES

RULE CrRLJ 4.7 DISCOVERY (a) Prosecuting Authority's Obligations.

(1) Except as otherwise provided by protective orders or as to matters not subject to disclosure, the prosecuting authority shall, upon written demand, disclose to the defendant the following material and information within his or her possession or control concerning:

(i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements of such witnesses;

(ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant, or made by a codefendant if the trial is to be a joint one;

(iii) any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons;

(iv) any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects which the prosecuting authority intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belonged to the defendant;

(v) any record of prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting authority of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial;

(vi) any electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, of the defendant's premises or conversations to which the defendant was a party and any record thereof;

(vii) any expert witnesses whom the prosecuting authority will call at the hearing or trial, the subject of their testimony, and any reports relating to the subject of their testimony that they have submitted to the prosecuting authority;

(viii) any information indicating entrapment of the defendant;

(ix) specified searches and seizures;

(x) the acquisition of specified statements from the defendant; and

(xi) the relationship, if any, of specified persons to the prosecuting authority.

(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, discoverable materials shall be made available for inspection and copying within 21 days of arraignment or within 21 days of receipt of the demand by the prosecuting authority, whichever is later.

(3) Except as otherwise provided by protective orders, the

prosecuting authority shall disclose to defendant's lawyer any material or information within his or her knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged.

(4)The prosecuting authority's obligation under this sectionis limited to material and information within the actual knowledge, possession, or control of members of his or her staff.

Rule ER 106 REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED STATEMENTS When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party at that time to introduce any other part, or any other writing or recorded statement, which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (CJC) PREAMBLE [1] An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system. [2] Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence impartiality, integrity, and competence.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (CJC) SCOPE [2] The Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe.  They provide important guidance in interpreting the Rules.  A judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule. [4] judges should strive to exceed the standards of conduct established by the Rules, holding themselves to the highest ethical standards and seeking to achieve those aspirational goals, thereby enhancing the dignity of the judicial office. [5] The Rules of the Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct are rules of reason that should be applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional law, and with due regard for all relevant circumstances. The Rules should not be interpreted to impinge upon the essential independence of judges in making judicial decisions. [6] Whether discipline should be imposed should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the Rules.  The relevant factors for consideration should include the seriousness of the transgression, the facts and circumstances that existed at the time of the transgression, including the willfulness or knowledge of the impropriety of the action, the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous violations, and the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial system or others.

CJC Rule 1.1 Compliance with the Law A judge shall comply with the law,* including the Code of Judicial Conduct. COMMENT See Scope [6].

CJC Rule 1.2 Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary

A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,* integrity,* and impartiality* of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.* COMMENT [1] Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct. This principle applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. [3] Conduct that compromises the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary. [5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, or provisions of this Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.

CJC Rule 2.2 Impartiality and Fairness A judge shall uphold and apply the law,* and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.*
COMMENT
[1] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded. [2] Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in question. [3] When applying and interpreting the law, a judge sometimes may make good-faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not violate this Rule. [4] It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.

CJC Rule 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice. (B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so. (C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or engaging in harassment, against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others.
COMMENT
[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute. [2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics.  Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased. [3] Harassment, as referred to in paragraphs (B) and (C), is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on bases such as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status,
socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.

CJC Rule 2.6 Ensuring the Right to Be Heard
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.* (B) Consistent with controlling court rules, a judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but should not act in a manner that coerces any party into settlement.
COMMENT
[1] The right to be heard is an essential component of a fair and impartial system of justice.  Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if procedures protecting the right to be heard are observed. [2] The judge plays an important role in overseeing the settlement of disputes, but should be careful that efforts to further settlement do not undermine any party's right to be heard according to law.  The judge should keep in mind the effect that the judge's participation in settlement discussions may have, not only on the judge's own views of the case, but also on the perceptions of the lawyers and the parties if the case remains with the judge after settlement efforts are unsuccessful.  Among the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon an appropriate settlement practice for a case are (1) whether the parties have requested or voluntarily consented to a certain level of participation by the judge in settlement discussions, (2) whether the parties and their counsel are relatively sophisticated in legal matters, (3) whether the case will be tried by the judge or a jury, (4) whether the parties participate with their counsel in settlement discussions, (5) whether any parties are unrepresented by counsel, and (6) whether the matter is civil or criminal.

CJC Rule 2.7 Responsibility to Decide
A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification or recusal is required by RULE 2.11 or other law.*
COMMENT
[1] Judges must be available to decide the matters that come before the court. Although there are times when disqualification is necessary to protect the rights of litigants and preserve public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must be available to decide matters that come before the courts. Unwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. The dignity of the court, the judge's respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the judge's colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification or recusal to avoid cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues.

CJC Rule 2.9 Ex Parte Communications
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending* or impending matter,* before that judge's court except as follows:
(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, or ex parte communication pursuant to a written policy or rule for a mental health court, drug court, or other therapeutic court, is permitted, provided: (a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and (b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication, and gives the parties an opportunity to respond. (2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge, if the judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the advice received. (3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.
(5) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law* to do so. (B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond. (C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter pending or impending before that judge, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed, unless expressly authorized by law. (D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts, including providing appropriate supervision, to ensure that this Rule is not violated by court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.
COMMENT[1] To the extent reasonably possible, all parties or their lawyers shall be included in communications with a judge. [2] Whenever the presence of a party or notice to a party is required by this Rule, it is the party's lawyer, or if the party is unrepresented, the party, who is to be present or to whom notice is to be given. [3] The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications with lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted by this Rule. [4] A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts.  In this capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others. [5] A judge may consult with other judges on pending matters, but must avoid ex parte discussions of a case with judges who have previously been disqualified from hearing the matter, and with judges who have appellate jurisdiction over the matter. [6] The prohibition against a judge investigating the facts in a matter extends to information available in all mediums, including electronic. [7] A judge may consult ethics advisory committees, outside counsel, or legal experts concerning the judge's compliance with this Code. Such consultations are not subject to the restrictions of paragraph (A)(2).

CJC Rule 2.10 Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases (A) A judge shall not make any public statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending* or impending* in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that would reasonably be expected to substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. (B) A judge shall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office. (D) Notwithstanding the restrictions in paragraph (A), a judge may make public statements in the course of official duties, may explain court procedures, and may comment on any proceeding in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.
COMMENT [1] This Rule's restrictions on judicial speech are essential to the maintenance of the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. [4] A judge should use caution in discussing the rationale for a decision and limit such discussion to what is already public record or controlling law.

CJC Rule 2.11 Disqualification(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.CJC Rule 3.1 Extrajudicial Activities in General COMMENT[2]  Discriminatory actions and expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's official or judicial actions, are likely to appear to a reasonable person to call into question the judge's integrity and impartiality.  Examples include jokes or other remarks that demean individuals based upon their race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status. For the same reason, a judge's extrajudicial activities must not be conducted in connection or affiliation with an organization that practices invidious discrimination. 2.11.

Rule 3.6SRP Rule (a)SRP Rule (b)SRP Rule (c)SRP Rule (d)SRP Rule (f)

RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule

COMMENT

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specificobligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro e with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

[3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of 
information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.
[4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in w
hich there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship.
[5] Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an 
adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem 
of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe 
consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have 
a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements 
which a prosecutor may make which complywith Rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c).
[6]  Like  other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1  and  5.3, which  relate to responsibilities regarding 
lawyers and nonlawyers who  work for  or  are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph 
(f) reminds  the prosecutor  of  the importance of these obligations in connection  with  the 
unique  dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, 
paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent  persons  
assisting or associated with the  prosecutor  from making improper extrajudicial statements, 
even when such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, 
the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate 
cautions o law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

RULE CrRLJ 4.7 DISCOVERY (a) Prosecuting Authority's Obligations.

(1) Except as otherwise provided by protective orders or as to matters not subject to disclosure, the prosecuting authority shall, upon written demand, disclose to the defendant the following material and information within his or her possession or control concerning:

(i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements of such witnesses;

(ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant, or made by a codefendant if the trial is to be a joint one;

(iii) any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons;

(iv) any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects which the prosecuting authority intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belonged to the defendant;

(v) any record of prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting authority of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial;

(vi) any electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, of the defendant's premises or conversations to which the defendant was a party and any record thereof;

(vii) any expert witnesses whom the prosecuting authority will call at the hearing or trial, the subject of their testimony, and any reports relating to the subject of their testimony that they have submitted to the prosecuting authority;

(viii) any information indicating entrapment of the defendant;

(ix) specified searches and seizures;

(x) the acquisition of specified statements from the defendant; and

(xi) the relationship, if any, of specified persons to the prosecuting authority.

(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, discoverable materials shall be made available for inspection and copying within 21 days

of arraignment or within 21 days of receipt of the demand by the prosecuting authority, whichever is later.

(3) Except as otherwise provided by protective orders, the

prosecuting authority shall disclose to defendant's lawyer any material or information within his or her knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged.

(4)The prosecuting authority's obligation under this sectionis limited to material and information within the actual knowledge, possession, or control of members of his or her staff.

RULE 5.2 CHANGE OF VENUE (2) Upon motion of the defendant, supported by affidavit, that the defendant believes he or she cannot receive a fair trial in the district where the action is pending; or (3) Upon motion of either party that the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice would be served by such change; or (c) Procedure on Transfer. When the court orders a change of venue it shall direct that all the papers and proceedings be certified to the court of the proper district. The defendant and subpoenaed witnesses shall have a continuing obligation to appear and attend as required.

Rule 8.4 Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; (g) commit a discriminatory act prohibited by state law on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status, where the act of discrimination is committed in connection with the lawyer's professional activities. In addition, it is professional misconduct to commit a discriminatory act on the basis of sexual orientation if such an act would violate this Rule when committed on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, or marital status. This Rule shall not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or withdraw from the representation of a client in accordance with Rule 1.16; (h) in representing a client, engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice toward judges, other parties and/or their counsel, witnesses and/or their counsel, jurors, or court personnel or officers, that a reasonable person would interpret as manifesting prejudice or bias on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status. This Rule does not restrict a lawyer from representing a client by advancing material factual or legal issues or arguments. (i) commit any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise, and whether the same constitutes a felony or misdemeanor or not; and if the act constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding shall not be a condition precedent to disciplinary action, nor shall acquittal or dismissal thereof preclude the commencement of a disciplinary proceeding; (j) willfully disobey or violate a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; (k) violate his or her oath as an attorney; (l) violate a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter; including, but not limited to, the duties catalogued at ELC 1.5; (m) violate the Code of Judicial Conduct; or (n) engage in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.

Washington State Constitution

                                                                                                   ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Section 1 Political Power. All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.

Do you understand that you only have the power you have because it is granted by US THE PEOPLE

Section 2 Supreme Law Of The Land. The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.

Contrary to your belief that you don't have to follow the Constitution because you are a first class city

Section 3 Personal Rights. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. I can't even begin to count the ways that the city of Everett has violated all of this

Section 4 Right Of Petition And Assemblage. The right of petition and of the people peaceably to assemble for the common good shall never be abridged.

Section 5 Freedom Of Speech. Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.

Section 6 Oaths - Mode Of Administering. The mode of administering an oath, or affirmation, shall be such as may be most consistent with and binding upon the conscience of the person to whom such oath, or affirmation, may be administered.

Section 7 Invasion Of Private Affairs Or Home Prohibited. No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.

Section 9 Rights Of Accused Persons. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Section 10 Administration Of Justice. Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.

Section 11 Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion;

Section 13 Habeas Corpus. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety requires it.

Section 14 Excessive Bail, Fines And Punishments. Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.

Section 15 Convictions, Effect Of. No conviction shall work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture of estate.

Section 21 Trial By Jury. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, and for a verdict by nine or more jurors in civil cases in any court of record, and for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given thereto.

Section 22 Rights Of The Accused. In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed and the right to appeal in all cases: In no instance shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. [AMENDMENT 10, 1921 p 79 Section 1. Approved November, 1922.]

Section 29 Constitution Mandatory. The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.

Section 30 Rights Reserved. The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people.

Section 32 Fundamental Principles. A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government.

Section 6 Jurisdiction Of Superior Courts. Superior courts and district courts have concurrent jurisdiction in cases in equity. The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to three thousand dollars or as otherwise determined by law, or a lesser sum in excess of the jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace and other inferior courts, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; of actions of forcible entry and detainer; of proceedings in insolvency; of actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; of all matters of probate, of divorce, and for annulment of marriage; and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; and said court shall have the power of naturalization and to issue papers therefor. They shall have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law. They shall always be open, except on nonjudicial days, and their process shall extend to all parts of the state. Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition, and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective counties. Injunctions and writs of prohibition and of habeas corpus may be issued and served on legal holidays and nonjudicial days. [AMENDMENT 87, 1993 House Joint Resolution No. 4201, p 3063. Approved November 2, 1993.]

                                                                               ARTICLE XXVI COMPACT WITH THE UNITED STATES
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of this state: First. That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and that no inhabitant of this state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship.

Side by side analysis of EMCandRCW

Summary:

1. The only place for hearing in EMC 6.04 is for denial of kennel license, EMC 6.04.060 otherwise noted there is no provision for a fair hearing to be held at a meaningful time regarding impound or destruction of animals.

2. EMC 6.04.070(C)(10) provides for notice ONLY when the animal has been abandoned, and gives no clear time limit, where as RCW 16.52 gives the time limit of 36 hours and provides for Notice of Legal Remedies 16.52.085(3)

6.04.070 Prohibited conduct.

C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to:
10) Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty as defined in RCW 16.52.205, confine an animal within or on a motor vehicle at any location under such conditions as may endanger the health or well-being of the animal, including but not limited to extreme temperatures, lack of food or water, or confinement with a dangerous animal. Any animal control or peace officer is authorized to remove any animal from a motor vehicle, at any location, when he/she reasonably believes it is confined in such conditions as described above. Any animal so removed shall be delivered to the animal control shelter after the removing officer leaves written notice of such removal and delivery, including the officer’s name, in a conspicuous, secure location on or within the vehicle;
16.52.085 Removal of animals for feeding and care — Examination — Notice — Euthanasia.
(3) Any owner whose domestic animal is removed pursuant to this chapter shall be given written notice of the circumstances of the removal and notice of legal remedies available to the owner. The notice shall be given by posting at the place of seizure, by delivery to a person residing at the place of seizure, or by registered mail if the owner is known. In making the decision to remove an animal pursuant to this chapter, the officer shall make a good faith effort to contact the animal's owner before removal.
3) RCW 16.52.011(K) clearly states an animal is to have “Necessary” water, EMC 6.04.00(C)(2) states the animal must have “Constant” water. In direct conflict with Washington state laws
16.52.011 Definitions — Principles of liability.
(k) "Necessary water" means water that is in sufficient quantity and of appropriate quality for the species for which it is intended and that is accessible to the animal.
6.04.070 Prohibited conduct. C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to:
(2) Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty as defined in RCW 16.52.205, fail to provide an animal with sufficient good and wholesome food and a constant source of clear potable water, proper shelter and protection from the weather, veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering, and with humane care and treatment;
4) RCW 16.52.207 Offers an affirmative defense EMC 6.04 Offers none in these times of economic hardships. When one reads and prescribes to state law, and believe that they are following the law these types of codes do nothing more than confound honest citizens and criminalize them. The Washington State Constitution clearly states the purpose of laws in harmony is to make sure they don't make criminals of honest citizens
16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree — Penalty.
(a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure;
(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's control.
5) RCW 16.52.085(4) Clearly provides remedies of Permanent deprivation or taking of the Govt, forfeiture is never favored by the law, and no where in EMC does it give any owner a time or place or way to be heard in a meaningful manner, the remedy implied is so vague that it can't be surmised what it actually means and then to add to the confusion the shelter manager has supreme discretion over the whole matter, giving her absolute power
6) RCW 16.52.085(5) Offers remedies for a hearing on forfeiture, and gives time to be heard in a meaningful manner. EMC 6.04 offers no such protection on due process
16.52.085 Removal of animals for feeding and care — Examination — Notice — Euthanasia.
(4) The agency having custody of the animal may euthanize the animal or may find a responsible person to adopt the animal not less than fifteen business days after the animal is taken into custody. A custodial agency may euthanize severely injured, diseased, or suffering animals at any time. An owner may prevent the animal's destruction or adoption by: (a) Petitioning the district court of the county where the animal was seized for the animal's immediate return subject to court-imposed conditions, or (b) posting a bond or security in an amount sufficient to provide for the animal's care for a minimum of thirty days from the seizure date. If the custodial agency still has custody of the animal when the bond or security expires, the animal shall become the agency's property unless the court orders an alternative disposition. If a court order prevents the agency from assuming ownership and the agency continues to care for the animal, the court shall order the owner to renew a bond or security for the agency's continuing costs for the animal's care. When a court has prohibited the owner from owning, caring for, or residing with a similar animal under RCW 16.52.200(4), the agency having custody of the animal may assume ownership upon seizure and the owner may not prevent the animal's destruction or adoption by petitioning the court or posting a bond.
(5) If no criminal case is filed within fourteen business days of the animal's removal, the owner may petition the district court of the county where the animal was removed for the animal's return. The petition shall be filed with the court, with copies served to the law enforcement or animal care and control agency responsible for removing the animal and to the prosecuting attorney. If the court grants the petition, the agency which seized the animal must deliver the animal to the owner at no cost to the owner. If a criminal action is filed after the petition is filed but before the animal is returned, the petition shall be joined with the criminal matter.
(6) In a motion or petition for the animal's return before a trial, the burden is on the owner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the animal will not suffer future neglect or abuse and is not in need of being restored to health.
7) EMC 6.04.090 Gives Constitutional and Statutory powers to a shelter manager to be used under their own discretion, thereby creating a very dangerous precedent for the destruction, permanent deprivation of property and rights, furthermore the administrative decisions can not super cede the laws of Washington State. They can chose to release an animal or destroy an animal at their whim, not according to law. RCW 16.52.210 provides at the very least notification of destruction of an animal so the owner is afforded an opportunity to contest. The shelter manager has discretion in a criminal case to “decide” if they will let a veterinarian come in to examine the animals thereby destroying any meaningful defense an accused person may have when the taking of one's property automatically triggers due process.
6.04.090 Shelter operation—Impoundment procedures—Release and disposal.
G. Impoundment and Disposition of Animals.
1. Any impounded animal shall be released to the owner upon payment of impoundment, care and license fees unless in the discretion of the manager or his/her designee there is an ongoing investigation of a violation of this chapter or state law. The manager or his/her designee may release the animal to the owner’s authorized representative; full identification of the owner and their authorized representative must be provided to animal control prior to release.
6. The owner of any animal retained at the shelter pending legal action pertaining to violations of this chapter and/or other judicial actions or hearings, pertaining to his/her ownership/responsibilities regarding the animal, shall be liable for all fees prescribed by fee schedule, upon conviction.
7. The manager shall dispose of animals held for the prescribed period without redemption or adoption only by means of euthanasia; provided, however, that irrespective of any prescribed holding period the manager, upon advice of a licensed veterinarian, may immediately dispose of any sick or injured impounded animal by euthanasia.
16.52.210 Destruction of animal by law enforcement officer — Immunity from liability.
This chapter shall not limit the right of a law enforcement officer to destroy an animal that has been seriously injured and would otherwise continue to suffer. Such action shall be undertaken with reasonable prudence and, whenever possible, in consultation with a licensed veterinarian and the owner of the animal. Law enforcement officers and licensed veterinarians shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for actions taken under this chapter if reasonable prudence is exercised in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.
6.04.110 Administration and enforcement by manager.
C The manager shall be empowered to exercise the authority of peace officers to extent necessary to enforce this chapter, which powers shall include issuance of citations, seizure and impoundment of animals subject to this chapter, including pursuit onto city-owned property, vacant property and unenclosed private property and subsequent impoundment.8) RCW 16.52.200 Specifically states an animal may only be ordered forfeited by the courts at the time of trial IF an animal has died because of the mistreatment or upon a second conviction. EMC 6.04 remains silent on this stating only in EMC 6.04.090 that an owner shall be responsible for shelter fees upon conviction.
16.52.200 Sentences Forfeiture of animals Liability for costs Penalty Education, counseling.
(3) In addition to the penalties imposed by the court, the court shall order the forfeiture of all animals held by law enforcement or animal care and control authorities under the provisions of this chapter if any one of the animals involved dies as a result of a violation of this chapter or if the defendant has a prior conviction under this chapter. In other cases the court may enter an order requiring the owner to forfeit the animal if the court deems the animal's treatment to have been severe and likely to reoccur. The court may delay its decision on forfeiture under subsection (3) of this section until the end of the probationary period.
6.04.090 Shelter operation—Impoundment procedures—Release and disposal.
G. Impoundment and Disposition of Animals.
6. The owner of any animal retained at the shelter pending legal action pertaining to violations of this chapterand/or other judicial actions or hearings, pertaining to his/her ownership/responsibilities regarding the animal, shall be liable for all fees prescribed by fee schedule, upon conviction.
For statutory provisions concerning animals generally, see RCW Title 16; for statutory provisions concerning prevention of cruelty to animals, see Ch. 16.52 RCW; for provisions on the animal shelter advisory committee, see Ch. 2.99 of this code.

                                                    QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT

1. Does the ordinance conflict with the state law, either because of conflicting policies or operational effect, that is, does the ordinance forbid what the Legislature has permitted?

2. Was the state law intended expressly or impliedly to be exclusive in the field?

3. Does the subject matter reflect a need for uniformity?

4. Is the state scheme so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation?

5. Does the ordinance stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the Legislature It would be too confusing & contradictory to a citizen to have to decipher between 2 different laws which are dis-similar in language in order to be put on notice which conduct is prohibited. Petitioner thought she was well within her legal duty to the State of Washington, and was in no way disturbing any public codes of conduct as defined by Washington State Statutes. This case is especially disturbing in the fact that it is not simply a matter of a question of 1 code conflict but that it encompasses the entire ordinance as a whole. How can one Municipality create codes that in essence make them a nation unto themselves? Ms Taamu understands that it is imperative that cities be able to make & create codes that ensure public peace, but to disregard the very tenets of the laws that this great Nation was built upon is nothing more than pomp and total disregard for the people, whom the city owes it's very existence to. In looking to State Appellate and Supreme Court Rulings it is apparent that the city of Everett has lost every case concerning the taking of property. Isn't this enough to put the city on notice that they should re-examine their policies in regard to the wonton destruction of people's civil liberties or are we to believe that in the face of a 10 million dollar budget shortfall that the City of Everett unlimited legal resources at their disposal to continue this behavior?

Under the side by side analysis it is readily apparent that RCW 16.52 preempts EMC 6.04 At a minimum, the plain language declares the State's intention that the statute constitute the exclusive law in this area.

Perhaps more importantly, however, is the danger that the procedural features of a municipal ordinance would conflict with the dictates of the statute--as they did in this case--thus inevitably leading to confusion among the parties and the inefficient enforcement of the Act. A servant can serve but one master; in this case, that master is the Legislature.

As the statute makes no provision for initiating an action by any means other than impoundment of the dog, it is clear that the City of Everett did not proceed in accordance with the Act. Neither did the municipal court require the City of Everett to comply strictly with the statute's procedural demands. The court had ample opportunity to address this issue, by refusing to entertain proceedings on this matter until an action was initiated The court also should have found that RCW 16.52 preempted any Everett ordinance which dealt with this subject. As further example 16.52.085 (c) requires confiscating officer to leave notice of impound & legal remedies by posting and by certified mail, the city's ordinance provide no such procedures & in conflict with state law

By failing to take any action to cure these jurisdictional deficiencies, the municipal court deprived itself of the legal authority to hear this case and make any rulings therein. This court therefore holds that the municipal court did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.
I would beg the courts forgiveness if I am wrong but I am merely a Citizen, I am not a member of the bar, and it would seem to the lay person that this whole case is wrong in every moral sense of the way, as well as in any legal way that makes any sense. It would seem the scheme of the city of Everett Ordinances are set up to confound it's citizens and the citizens of the state of Washington and we beg for relief from the oppression and deprivation of out basic civil and human rights
Addendum to Analysis:
In further research of state codes I would submit that the State of Washington by omission never intended for City of the First Class to have Supreme ruling over animal control matters, that it in fact intended to have sole discretion over Animal Laws to prevent lawsuits against the state. 2^nd Class cities and towns both have provisions for Poundkeepers & Estrays, no where in Washington state RCW's does any First Class City even mention any of the above. The ONLY provision in State RCW's for First Class Cities are their Nuisance laws, but again even in those no mention of Animal Welfare or Control is mentioned, not even a mention of barking dogs or dogs running at large.

35.23.440 Specific powers enumerated.

The city council of each second-class city shall have power and authority:

(11) Stock pound: To establish, maintain, and regulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, who shall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed and collected of the owners of any animals impounded, and from no other source; to prevent and regulate the running at large of any and all domestic animals within the city limits or any parts thereof, and to regulate or prevent the keeping of such animals within any part of the city.

35.27.370 Specific powers enumerated.

The council of said town shall have power:

(1) To pass ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States;

(9)To license, for purposes of regulation and revenue, all and every kind of business, authorized by law and transacted and carried on in such town; and all shows, exhibitions and lawful games carried on therein and within one mile of the corporate limits thereof; to fix the rate of license tax upon the same, and to provide for the collection of the same, by suit or otherwise; to regulate, restrain, or prohibit the running at large of any and all domestic animals within the city limits, or any part or parts thereof, and to regulate the keeping of such animals within any part of the city; to establish, maintain and regulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, who shall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed on, and collected from, the owners of any impounded stock. A city may not require a business to be licensed based solely upon registration under or compliance with the streamlined sales and use tax agreement;

35.22.280 Specific powers enumerated.

Any city of the first class shall have power:

(30) To declare what shall be a nuisance, and to abate the same, and to impose fines upon parties who may create, continue, or suffer nuisances to exist;

(33) To regulate the carrying on within its corporate limits of all occupations which are of such a nature as to affect the public health or the good order of said city, or to disturb the public peace, and which are not prohibited by law, and to provide for the punishment of all persons violating such regulations, and of all persons who knowingly permit the same to be violated in any building or upon any premises owned or controlled by them;

(34) To restrain and provide for the punishment of vagrants, mendicants, prostitutes, and other disorderly persons;

(35) To provide for the punishment of all disorderly conduct, and of all practices dangerous to public health or safety, and to make all regulations necessary for the preservation of public morality, health, peace, and good order within its limits, and to provide for the arrest, trial, and punishment of all persons charged with violating any of the ordinances of said city. The punishment shall not exceed a fine of five thousand dollars or imprisonment in the city jail for three hundred sixty-four days, or both such fine and imprisonment. The punishment for any criminal ordinance shall be the same as the punishment provided in state law for the same crime. Such cities alternatively may provide that violations of ordinances constitute a civil violation subject to monetary penalties, but no act which is a state crime may be made a civil violation;

Upon further examination of the Everett Municipal Code there are several other matters which are unethical, illegal and unconstitutional as well. Municipal Code can NOT be more restrictive than state law. The premise that my animals were removed for was that I did not have a CONSTANT source of water for the animals, which would not have been feasible in my situation at that time, bordering on economic discrimination to which a homeless defense would prevail. Chapter 35.27. Towns. 35.27.370. Specific powers enumerated Everett Municipal Code 6.04.070 (c)(2)Prohibited conduct. C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to: Revised Code of Washington RCW 16.52.310 The Everett Municipal Code is in direct conflict with the Revised Code of Washington

It is the City of Everett's custom and practice under its animal ordinances to not provide a notice of seizure and legal remedies to owner, or a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing concerning the owner's property interests in pets and perhaps disposal of them. The City of Everett ordinances must provide an owner notice of seizure under RCW 16.52.085 and his or her legal remedies. (Please See Exhibits Side By Side Analysis of EMC v RCW)

EMC states that an animal may be euthanized immediately at the shelters discretion, RCW 16.52.085(4) states nearly the same but prescribes remedies which are available when proper notice is given, which was never the case nor was it required in my case according to Everett Municipal Code. Further RCW 16.52.210 clearly states an owner must be notified and prudence used in the process which was never the case, as a matter of fact the euthansia of one of my animals was withheld for several weeks and the body of said animal has supposedly been lost. It should be noted that when I called the shelter after finding out her animals had been euthanized, I was laughed at by the acting manager Shannon Delgado, which was cruel and unusual, and unbecoming a public servant. Again showing the malicious intent with which I have always been treated by Everett Animal Services EMC 6.04.070(7) RCW 16.52.085(4) RCW 16.52.210

On its face, EMC Title 6.04 et seq. and the City's custom and practice does not provide an owner with a notice of seizure, his/her legal remedies, or a hearing to challenge the legality of the seizure or the reasonableness of incurred boarding expenses. Or, whether the owner is able to care properly for her own animals after a determination by her own veterinarian at the time of impound. EMC Title 6.04 requires that the owner "pay the expenses incurred" in order to redeem his animal. Further more EMC 6.04.110 gives SUPREME power to the shelter manger to decide law, & gives them discretion to use or abuse (as is the case here) at their whim, & to basically change the rules as they see fit.

The Everett Municipal Ordinances under Title 6 above do not include any language from which we could infer that the ordinances authorize officials to provide an opportunity for a hearing t o challenge the legality of the seizure, or the reasonableness of the boarding charge.

Finally, I would argue that RCW 16.52.085 et seq., which provides that a person whose property was seized with or without a warrant may “Petition” for its return in the District Court for the county in which the property was seized, gave the City of Everett authority to provide me with opportunity for notice of the seizure, my legal remedies, and right to petition for the animals return through a hearing to contest the seizure. This statute relates to the City's seizure and/or disposal of animals seized on the basis of neglect. RCW 16.52.085 purports to establish procedural safeguards for the City's determination of an owner's rights in his pets.

Thus, state statute can be interpreted as requiring the City of Everett municipal ordinances to provide for notice and an opportunity for a hearing following seizure to determine defendant's property interest in his seized animals, reasonableness of boarding charges, and possible termination of defendant's property interest. However, the City of Everett ignored this procedure, denying defendant appropriate due process safeguards.

In this case, I am left with the conclusion that the City of Everett ordinances under Title 6.04 et. seq., under which my pets were seized and the information was filed, fails to require that animal owners be provided notice of seizure, his/her legal remedies concerning such a seizure, and an opportunity to “Petition” and have a hearing to determine ownership rights, boarding fees, condition of the pets at seizure and impound, whether the owner or a representative can adequately care for the animals, etc.

The City of Everett ordinances under EMC 6.04 et. seq., nowhere provide for a hearing to defendant regarding the lawfulness of seizure and impound of her pets. Nothing in these statutes legitimizes the City's actions to deny my procedural due process safeguards. I have already claimed ownership of my seized pets and has vigorously contested the seizure under Washington State statutes by demanding a hearing – to no avail. Decisions construing the federal and state due process guarantees generally require that an individual receive notice and some form of hearing before he is deprived of his property or liberty. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82, 92 S.Ct. 1983,1994-1995, 32 L.Ed.2d 556. The constitutionality of the Everett ordinance or statute justifying seizure rests upon its provision for notice of seizure and a prompt post-seizure hearing to defendant. I have filed NUMEROUS Motions to dismiss and petitions for the return of my pets, which have all been ignored even though I pointed out the Constitutional disparities in the Municipal Codes

The requirement for notice of seizure and a hearing cannot be implied from the Everett municipal ordinance. In fact, quite the contrary. Here the City of Everett Municipal ordinances do not provide for any pre- or post-seizure hearing, and there is no room to imply the necessity of notice and a hearing under its construction.

It is well established that the statute or ordinance itself must provide for notice and a hearing and that a gratuitous hearing does not cure a deficient law. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works (1915) 237 U.S. 413, 424-425, 35 S.Ct. 625, 629, 59 L.Ed. 1027. Any hearing granted as a matter of discretion is no substitute for due process. 'It is not enough that the owners may by chance have notice, or that they may as a matter of favor have a hearing. The law must require notice to them, and give them the right to a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.' " Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, supra, 237 U.S. 413, 424-425, 35 S.Ct. 625, 629, 59 L.Ed. 1027.

The rule is well settled that to constitute due process of law in regard to the taking of property, the statute or ordinance should give the parties interested some adequate remedy for the vindication of their rights. A provision in the statute or ordinance providing for notice of seizure, and the owner's legal remedies after confiscation and a hearing, ensures that the response of the administrative entity will be a settled and uniform, and not an haphazard, procedure.

The City of Everett municipal ordinances under which my pets were seized is unconstitutional for failure to provide for notice, defendant's legal remedies following a seizure of pets, and a hearing either before or after the seizure of pets pursuant to RCW 16.52.085 et seq. The ordinance in question here should end, "not with a bang but a whimper." 1 The ordinances at issue for seizing and impounding animals are unconstitutional. I am entitled not only to the immediate return of my pets, but to dismissal of the information against me. Alternatively the search should be invalidated and any evidence derived from the search and seizure of her pets 1. See The Hollow Men (1925), with apologies to T.S. Eliot.

"In determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa." Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N. E. 519 [(1923)]. Judged by such a test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute permits]..]' State v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 N. E. 2d 245, 246 [(1937)].

The federal judiciary has many examples of jurists holding a constitutional view toward “The People’s” rights, as in Racine v. California, 342 US 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952): “There is no justification for the knowing and deliberate violation of the rights of individuals.” Art. XI, § 11 is a direct delegation of legislative power. Under article 11, section 11, cities have the right to enact ordinances prohibiting the same acts state law prohibits so long as the state enactment was not intended to be exclusive and the city ordinance does not conflict with the general law of the state. [City of] Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292, 92 A.L.R.2d 192 (1960). Thus, the ordinance must yield to a statute on the same subject either if the statute preempts the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, Diamond Parking, Inc. v. [City of] Seattle, 78 Wn.2d 778, 781, 479 P.2d 47 (1971), or if a conflict exists such that the two cannot be harmonized. [City of] Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 722, 730, 585 P.2d 784 (1978).

Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559. Thus, an ordinance is not in conflict with general law for purposes of art. XI, § 11 unless (1) the state has expressly or impliedly preempted the field, or (2) the ordinance permits what state law forbids, or vice versa. The appeal presents four issues: whether the Ordinance (1) conflicts with RCW or various other "general laws." such that it violates article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution;

(2) is an unreasonable exercise of City of Everett's power;

(3) is violative of substantive due process; or

(4) is unconstitutionally vague. In essence, the trial court found that the Ordinance forbid an activity the statute impliedly allowed. "A law is a reasonable regulation if it promotes public safety, health or welfare and bears a reasonable and substantial relation to accomplishing the purpose pursued." Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 592;

Const. art. XI, § II,«4» in that it conflicted with state law. Substantive Due Process [27] In the final prong of our analysis, we must examine whether the Ordinance violates substantive due process. We ask whether the enactment is "unduly oppressive." This inquiry "lodges wide discretion in the court and implies a balancing of the public's interest against those of the [person regulated]." Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 331, 787 P.2d 907 (1990). The purpose of this analysis is to prevent excessive police power regulations that would require an individual " ' to shoulder an economic burden, which in justice and fairness the public should rightfully bear." Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 648-49, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987); see also Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wn.2d 586, 610-11, 854 P.2d 1 (1993); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765 (1992); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 55, 830 P.2d 318 (1992). In Presbytery, we listed several nonexclusive factors relevant in determining whether an ordinance restricting property rights was unduly oppressive. These included "the nature of the harm sought to be avoided; the availability and effectiveness of less drastic protective measures; and the economic loss suffered by the property owner." Presbytery, 114 Wn.2d at 331 (citing Orion Corp., 109 Wn.2d at 655 n.24).

In this context the entire EMC is unconstitutional overbroad and vague. “We will hold an ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague if a challenger demonstrates the ordinance either

(1) fails to define the criminal offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed," or

(2) does not provide "ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990).      

 

City of Everett

Plaintiff

V

Brandia Taamu

Defendant

Comes now Brandia Taamu, I swear the following statements are true to the best of my knowledge under the penalty of perjury of the State of Washington & these United States.

Causes of Action

1) Ms Trask did do a warrantless search of my car on private property by peering inside, which I realize may invoke the plain view doctrine but by physically placing her hands on the vehicle to “check to see if the vehicle engine was warm” is an act of making a physical search. The vehicle was at his time defendants “home” The search was done initially without warrant by Officer Trask, by her inspecting and “placing her hands on vehicle hood to check to see if it was warm”, unless the city wants the courts to believe that Officer Trask is a clairvoyant & was able to tell that Ms Taamu was going to say she had arrived 20 minutes earlier. (See Exhibit 1,to1-c, 2, 3, 4,to,4-d) The car was not parked on public street, it was in fact located on private property. Alternatively, Ms. Taamu requests that all evidence flowing from this unconstitutional search and seizure be suppressed as Ms. Taamu has a viable due process claim of an inadequate, established procedure by the City of Everett as a result of the unconstitutionality of EMC 6.04 et seq.. There is no pre- or post-deprivation safeguard – in fact it is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue. The Everett animal impound ordinances fail to adequately define the scope of a humane officer's enforcement powers - with an ambiguous and unconstitutional grant of authority.

State v. Johnson, 909 P. 2d 293 I am satisfied, though, that the trial court correctly concluded here that the sleeping quarters in the cab of the Defendant's truck were part of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, as opposed to being merely an area accessible from the passenger compartment. Such a conclusion might not, however, be supportable in another case where a vehicle contains living quarters that are separate and distinct from the portion of the vehicle where the driver and passengers would ordinarily be located. In such a circumstance, the twofold rationale articulated in Stroud would not support a conclusion that a warrantless search of living quarters in a vehicle is justified. While I recognize, as the majority suggests, that bright line rules such as the rule in Stroud make the police officer's job easier, we should not give the rule such broad application that it totally submerges the protections our state's founders obviously had in mind when they adopted article I, section 7 of our state constitution. Carrera v. Bertaini, 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 134 Cal.Rptr. 14, . but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. Cf. Rios V Untied States State v. O'NEILL, 62 P. 3d 489 - Wash: Supreme Court

2) Defendant was never given notice of rights or responsibilities in regards to the taking of her animals, the city has no such form as required by state law.

3) Defendant was never given a copy of the probable cause statement, warrant or given a warrant inventory til some 7 months later at which time defendants cat & non-narcotic pain killers were not listed (See Exhibit 1,1-a,1-b,1-c, 2, 3)

4) Defendant was never allowed to see or send a qualified vet to examine her thereby destroying any defense she may have had in regards to the condition or health of her animals. The policies enforced by Animal Care and Control are not law and thereby not enforceable and in fact are unconstitutional in regards to refusing me access to my animals or to be able send a vet into the shelter to check the animals thereby destroying any chance I had to defend myself, and further amounting to cruel and unusual punishment and absolute outrage. (See side by side analysis)

5) Especially disturbing is the fact that defendants animals were taken at 10 to 11 a.m. Yet there is no record of said animals at the City shelter until 4:40 p.m. When they were taken from defendants care they were all warm safe & dry yet some 5 to 6 hours later they were reported as a) bleeding from the rectum/vent b) bloody c) missing teeth d) bleeding from the mouth e) having seizures f) hypothermic. Had animals been in such condition defendant would've been charged with felony animal abuse & cruelty (See exhibits 5 to 5-m, 6 to 6-k,7 to 7-i,8 to 8-d,9 to 9-e,10, 10a,11, 11a,12,13)

6) After many calls from defendant to the City Shelter manager where she explained her Native American Beliefs in regards to desecration of her terminally ill dog's remains, she was disregarded, George was mutilated & post it notes placed on or near his internal organs where it took defendant 15 months to find out that said animals was cremated & thrown away immediately (See exhibits 14, to 14-n) like trash in direct violation of American Indian Freedom of Religion act AKA the Public act, not only were defendants rights to bury the dead violated, & her dog's remains desecrated, but defendant was laughed at by Ms Delgado upon finding out that her dog was dead. “George”, who passed away from cancer after being impounded in the City Shelter, was outrageously necropsied, dissected, body parts tagged, photographed, and his body thrown way by City of Everett veterinarian or employees causing great emotional distress to the Defendant. (See Exhibit 15) Defendant, who held an important property interest in George's body, as well as my Native American belief and custom that George's body not be desecrated in such a way and received a respectful burial, has been damaged as a result of these unreasonable and incomprehensible actions by the City of Everett. Even if AIFRA does not have any teeth the cruel & unusual clause of the Constitution of the United States clearly does, this case could be a text-book example to cite in other cases.

7) At no time did the city of Everett lay claim to my animals, Govt taking is never favored, but defendant made many feeble attempts at trying to regain her property in animal. RCW 69.505 gives very clear & concise procedures of divesting citizens of their property. My first request made to the City of Everett incorrectly has mysteriously disappeared & was sent to their witnesses house not mine, the second request I had copies of (See Exhibit 16 & 16a) This is a pattern of behavior as evidenced in Stoot V Everett & Espinoza V Everett the city of Everett Codes remain silent on matters of forfeiture & RCW 69 clearly shows legislative intent to protect the rights of citizens in a Constitutional manner In regards to the euthanasia of George amounting to permanent deprivation of property and the continued impound of my animals/property my due process rights have been blatantly trampled on. There is no question that I have a protected property interest in the ownership of these animals, and the seizure and impoundment of these dogs triggers due process, Pasco v. Reihl, 635 So.2d 17 (S.Ct. 1994). “In the instant case, the petitioner's private property was subject to, among other things, physical confinement, and muzzling. In the aggregate, these restrictions are a deprivation of property and before such restrictions are imposed, a property owner must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. I have suffered a deprivation of property without benefit of a hearing, and such violation was a violation of client's procedural due process rights. ” Id. at 19. See also, Mansour v. King, 131 Wash. App. 255 (Wash. App.2006) and Philips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. of Animal Regulation, 183 Ca. App. 3d 372 (Cal. App. 1986). The deprivation here is unquestionably more severe than Pasco, as this case involves destruction; a total, complete and final deprivation of my property rights & the tragic outrageous loss of a companion animal in his final hours on this earth. The animals were not considered contraband and I am the rightful owners of these dogs and cats, my property in dogs and cats is not “contraband”, statutory procedures for seizure of property have not been followed, and the seized property in pets must be returned to the the rightful owner. As noted in RCW 69.505 If the city argues that the pets are “derivative contraband” the city must follow property forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in dogs and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look to federal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as in this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures. The proper procedures by statute are enumerated above. I received no lawful notice and my due process rights were violated. RCW 69.50.505 Seizure and forfeiture. 69.50.505(a)(2). Everett Municipal Code remains silent on forfeiture procedure and safeguards to prevent erroneous deprivation My ownership interest in the pets seized from me by the City of Everett and its impound agent is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434, 102 S. Ct. at 1156. “The State may not destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to present his claim of entitlement.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579,95 St. Ct. 729, 738 (1975). Due process requires some kind of notice and some kind of hearing. A pre-deprivation hearing is not required in all circumstances, however. For example, where the State must of a necessity act quickly. This was not the case here. Or, where the degree of deprivation is not serious. Also, this was not the case here. I was never given the required notice of seizure by the City of Everett impounding officer, and of my legal remedies to petition the District Court for return of my animals and/or to determine the reasonableness of boarding fees. The Mathews test is often used to determine what kind of process is required. Mathews v. Eldridge, Id. See, also Mansour v. King County, 128 P.3d 1241 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2006) . The ownership rights of the defendant were terminated by the seizure, the animals have apparently been treated as strays by the City and placed in foster care or were otherwise disposed of. The City of Everett has failed to provide Defendant with due process prior to, or following, each of these deprivations of property in my sentient property. The City actors in this case being agents of the city desecrated George’s body and refused to return him to me, so that he can be washed, wrapped, blessed and set free from his earthly bounds. He holds no further evidence, as shown by the fact that he was just tossed away like so much trash, this would and does constitute Cruel And Unusual Punishment in direct violation of the 8^th Amendment of the United States of America, for a crime he was never guilty of. Withholding information about my animals, and further secreting them away constitutes theft according to RCW 9.56.020. The taking, conversion, killing and secreting of my property and animals amounts to a direct violation of RCW9.08.070.1(a)(c) at no time in these proceedings have I been allowed to see her animals, and for many many months I could not even get the city to tell me if they were even alive, even terrorists offer a sign of life. Just to be clear, we are not discussing a car or an object that was used in the commission of a crime: We are talking about living breathing thinking feeling sentient beings, this is akin to kidnapping someone's children. For 26 months I have lived in total utter fear that my animals will come to further harm and that I will never see them again. We also submit that the Municipal Court had no right to order forfeiture without a formal hearing specifically to address forfeiture, but per RCW 69.505 they lost that right by not filing at the very least a notice within the 45 day period, whereas I filed a notice via the Superior court showing her own personal and legal interest in my animals in property. Generally when there is a Municipal code violation it falls under 1 of 2 categories, in this case it falls under both procedural and substantive in violation of my fundamental rights in spite of the compelling needs test of the city. The Everett Municipal codes regarding animals is vague and overbroad & denies any equal protection under the law that couldn't pass muster in a strict scrutiny test let a lone a middle tier scrutiny test or a rational basis test. The preemption here is both Express and Implied, as state and federal law expressly prohibit govt takings and demand due process which is not provided by Everett Municipal Code 6.04 both state & federal law occupy this field. The void-for-vagueness doctrine derives from the constitutional guarantee of due process, which requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense " `[1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" - in Mannix v. Phillips, 2010 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement. State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 117, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). Under the due process clause,5 a criminal prohibition is void for vagueness if it fails either (1) to define the offense with sufficient definiteness such that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, or (2) to provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Where an alleged error is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right, the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). - Wa v Allenbach

8th Amendment In United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), In describing what constituted "gross disproportionality," the Court could not find any guidance from the history of the Excessive Fines Clause and so relied on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case law: We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a constitutional excesiveness standard, and there are two that we find particularly relevant. The first, which we have emphasized in our cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, is that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (“Reviewing courts … should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes”); see also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy”). The second is that any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise. Both of these principles counsel against requiring strict proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense, and we therefore adopt the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, supra, at 288; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).

See Seguin v Eide, 720 F2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), on remand after judgment vacated, 462 U.S.1101,103 S. Ct. 2446 (1983); Wiren v Eide, 542 F2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976). Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1972); Jaekel v United States, 304 F Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y 1969); Glup v United States, 523 F2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1975). (See FED. R. CIV. P. Supplemental Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions Rule A(1)(B) (making rules applicable to forfeiture actions in rem arising from a federal statute) Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, "it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits." Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 35 S. Ct. 625, 629, 59 L. Ed. 1027 (1915). As we observed in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), only "wiping the slate clean ... would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place." The Due Process Clause demands no less in this case. Peralta, supra, 108 U.S. at 898-99, 900.

8) In a hearing instigated by defendant for return of her property in Animals, (See Exhibits 17 to 17-f) she was never made aware by the acting Commissioner nor the prosecution of a) her 5^th Amendments rights to not incriminate herself, & as a result most of what defendant raised at issue at this hearing was in fact what the City of Everett used against her in proceedings. b)The city further argued that they were not bound by the United States Constitution, the Washington Constitution and various state and federal laws as evidenced by the states exhibits of RCW 35.01.010 and RCW 35.22.010 because they were a first class city. c) This was also a the first time they accused defendant of crimes she was not guilty of nor was she charged with by the city attorney. I would submit that this was not “City Business” and as such the fact that Mr Iles stepped in to the prosecutor's dept shows that there is malicious intent on the part of the city to retaliate against the me, not just as a single agency but as a whole. If the prosecutor's Office is incapable of writing out their own briefs then I would submit that their competency be challenged as well.

Rule 8.4 Misconduct State v. Boehning State v. Coles , State v. Huson , State v. Dhaliwal (quoting State v. Pirtle) , State v. Russell , State v. Suarez-Bravo , State v. Brown , State v. Hoffman , State v. Jones , State v. Perez-Mejia State v. Belgarde , State v. Echevarria , State v. Neidigh , State v. Hoffman , State v. Russell , (citing United States v. Garza) , State v. Charlton , Arrieta-Agressot v. United States , United States v. Cabrera , United States v. Solivan , State v. Jungers State v. Reed ,

9) City Agents namely Shannon Delgado, Lori Trask-Lemaire-Carlon-Staib & Mike Fisher were sharing defendants personal information some true, some untrue with the city's witness who was using this to send out emails to more then 500 individuals & to post well over 100 ads on an internet board called craigslist. The harassment was so bad that defendant filed a 15 page police report (See Exhibits 18 to 18-L, please note that some of the pages are missing, it is unknown why) against their witness & sought to obtain a protection order for herself. At another time both of the city's witnesses did threaten defendant putting her in fear for her life to the point that she ran to the Everett Police Station & once again made a police report. The city was full aware of this as I sent them numerous emails requesting them to stop having their witnesses threaten & harass me. This violates the laws of blacklisting & makes the city liable for the conduct of their city's witness. Effectively Blacklisting RCW 49.44.010 defendant with the help of the City actors & interfering with the ability to do her job, or to enjoy life, or liberty, because of falsehoods & rumors instigated by the City Officers. Clearly making the City guilty of Criminal Sabatoge RCW 9.05.060, or at the very least Aiding & Abetting Ms Adams in the acts of Blacklisting, Criminal Sabotage, Intimidation, Harassment, Stalking as well as Slander & Libel. If they say they have NOT given Ms Adams the info that she is clearly stating they did then what does that say for the city's witness? RCW 42.52.050 Confidential information(1) (2) (3) (4) RCW 9A.36.078 Malicious harassment — Finding. RCW 42.23.070 Prohibited acts. RCW 42.52.020 Activities incompatible with public duties.

Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2011 11:13:13 -0800
From: stopanimalabuseandfraud@yahoo.com
Subject: Brandia Ta’amu/Fake Pet Rescuer/Does Not Have A 501(c)3/Frauding & Scamming For Money & Donations/All Her Animals Were Removed, by Everett Animal Control This Month!!!
To: animalcarenetwork@yahoogroups.com; information@popptricities.org; cascadeanimal@yahoo.com; melissa_companionanimal@hotmail.com; info@kindredsoulsfoundation.org; perrin@savinggreatanimals.org; spot@savingpetsoneatatime.org; violet@ucarerescue.com; sccpets@yahoo.com; drawashington@hotmail.com; info@vipp.org; dogs@vipp.org; sandjswanson@juno.com; info@paws.org; amy@seattlehumane.org; xol@drizzle.com; southsoundadoptions@gmail.com; vickijimniles@msn.com; dogfarm@gmail.com; andreanelson2005@yahoo.com; WECARE161@hotmail.com; angelahoschek@msn.com

Brandia Ta’amu came to stay at a friend’s home 32 days ago. Also, animal control displayed on their computer that Brandia has actually dumped off dogs at the Everett Animal Control. The last time which was two dogs, a Husky mix, and the other one said “Golden Lab/Retriever.
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From: roseandgeorge@hotmail.com
To: animalcarenetwork@yahoogroups.com; information@popptricities.org; cascadeanimal@yahoo.com; melissa_companionanimal@hotmail.com; info@kindredsoulsfoundation.org; perrin@savinggreatanimals.org; spot@savingpetsoneatatime.org; violet@ucarerescue.com; sccpets@yahoo.com; drawashington@hotmail.com; info@vipp.org; dogs@vipp.org; sandjswanson@juno.com; info@paws.org; amy@seattlehumane.org; xol@drizzle.com; southsoundadoptions@gmail.com; vickijimniles@msn.com; dogfarm@gmail.com; andreanelson2005@yahoo.com; wecare161@hotmail.com; angelahoschek@msn.com; betshar@fairpoint.net; rr_flores@comcast.net; outwestpetrescue@yahoo.com; thebigdogproject@yahoo.com; dogs@homewardpet.org; dmelsha@charter.net; rescue@cprgroup.org; toni@happytailsrescue.com; washingtonshepherds@yahoo.com; pattyk@folcas.org; jme@motleyzoo.org; marthalight@aol.com; sandy@animalnature.com; wigglesandwags@comcast.net; musicaldreams@gmail.com; dyarchak@q.com; camelot@gemsi.com; catherine.m.wilson@gmail.com; info@peopleunitedforpets.com; elleny@comcast.net; puglady@hotmail.com; nwinternationalpetrescue@gmail.com; shannon@loveamutt.org; lynn@loveamutt.org; cmanning23@comcast.net; crimis@msn.com; linda.logan@myquiznos.com
Subject: Why Brandia Taamu’s dogs & cats were taken!
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2011 07:22:11 -0800

Anyone who has any questions about WHY Brandia Taamu’s dogs were taken by Everett Animal Control can call them, or they can call me at Ph# 425-750-7126, since they came to my house with a search warrant for Brandia Taamu’s car, and took her animals that were extremely dehydrated! Everett Animal Control had to call me the other day to tell me I have to take all my animals in to be checked, because Brandia’s animals all had Giardia & Worms.

(***Messages truncated to include just the statements in question, the full emails can be viewed in my evidence file) RCW 9A.08.020 Liability for conduct of another Complicity. RCW 9A.08.010 General requirements of culpability.(1) Kinds of Culpability Defined. (a) (b) (i) (ii) (c) (d) (2) (3) (4) RCW 49.44.010 Blacklisting RCW 9.05.060

10) Mr Fisher had as a city's witness Jennifer Speelmon who was on the run with her sex-offender felony fugitive boyfriend and for whatever reasons Mr Fisher at no time ever informed the police where she and he were at to ensure she would come in and testify against me, it was in fact this defendant who had to get assistance in apprehending him from the Tulalip Tribal Police in order to have him arrested. This goes past misconduct or malicious intent to endanger the public to secure testimony against me flies in the face of public interest to ensure a conviction. Ms Speelmon even joked about the fact that they were “Bulletproof” because of this arrangement on her social network page, this is not only disgusting but it is totally reprehensible It would seem that I have an affirmative defense, but the prosecutor and the city are still pursuing charges, so much so that in order to garner a case against me they dropped 3 gross misdemeanor and 3 misdemeanor charges against the states witness in exchange for testimony against me for 1 misdemeanor. (See Exhibits 19 & 19a) Again in direct conflict with Rules 3.8 Also clearly showing the malicious intent with which I am being charged. It should also be noted that Ms Adams began her campaign against Ms Taamu on the same day she came to the Everett Municipal Court to request a hearing for those very same infractions. Rose Adams Cause# IN0128726 Charges, 3 of dangerous dog running at large, 3 of failure to display license, amended to 3 counts of failure to display license on Mar/4/2011 RULE 3.8 Special Responsibilities Of A Prosecutor

11) On one occasion the city was trying to schedule a hearing but I told them that it was a Jewish Holiday & requested a different date, at which point I was asked if I was a Jew or a Native, to which I replied both, by blood & asked if they would like to see DNA evidence. I said I was not aware that I had to “chose” which one to be. Defendant took all of the paperwork she was able to attain to several different attorneys to try to find competent defense but lack of finances did not afford defendant this luxury but all of them pointed out a very notable connection in all of Ms Trask's statements: In all of her statements she feels the need to describe defendant as a “Thin Native American Woman” she can not seem to help herself, no one else in any other statements they have made have felt the need to point out defendant's physical attributes or ethnicity to such a great extent in direct violation of numerous State and Federal laws, including Unlawful Discrimination, Color of Law, Malicious Prosecution, and Malfeasance RCW 9.91.010 Denial of civil rights Terms defined. RCW 49.60.030 Freedom from discrimination Declaration of civil rights. At first I blew it off but after 4 different attorneys all pointed it out I was faced with the truth. What kind of a world are we living in where a person's life can be destroyed, their livelihood almost ruined, the reputation drug through the mud & over 94 laws, rules of procedure & Constitutional rights be overlooked simply on the basis of being thin & being Native American? Unless there is some indicator or ordinance that defines that Thin Native American Women have a higher propensity to abuse or neglect animals in general. All under the guise of Color of Law... Supreme Court Justice Rutledge was very clear in his opinion of these types of abuses

In the words of Supreme Court Judge, Mr. Justice Rutledge He who acts under "Color" of law may be a federal officer or a state officer. He may act under "color" of federal law or of state law. The statute does not come into play merely because the federal law or the state law under which the officer purports to act is violated. It is applicable when and only when someone is deprived of a federal right by that action. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 108 (1945). "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of' state law." Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. "It is not open to question that this statute is constitutional. . . [It] dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump" United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 387. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 119 (1945) Separately, and often together in application, §§ 19 and 20 have been woven into our fundamental and statutory law. They have place among our more permanent legal achievements. They have safeguarded many rights and privileges apart from political ones. Among those buttressed, either by direct application or through the general conspiracy statute, § 37 (18 U.S.C. § 88),[24] are the rights to a fair trial, including freedom from sham trials; to be free from arrest and detention by methods constitutionally forbidden and from extortion of property by threat of levy, lien, or lock down letters by such methods; from extortion of confessions; from interference with the free exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly; the necessary import of the decisions is that the right to be free from deprivation of life itself, without due process of law, that is, through abuse of state power by state officials, is as fully protected as other rights so secured Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. They simply misconceived that the victim had no federal rights and that what they had done was not a crime within the federal power to penalize.[30] That kind of error relieves no one from penalty. "There is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of justice" - U.S. v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3d Cir. 1982)

12) The prosecution’s position seems to be that the virtue of its case sanctifies the means chosen to achieve conviction. This argument cannot prevail in a legal system that is designed to ensure fairness in the proceeding when each side follows the rules. Our confidence in the fairness of our system is rooted in the belief that our process is sound. Useful falsehoods are particularly dangerous in a criminal case, where the cost of wrongful conviction cannot be measured in the impact on the accused alone. Although the charge is only a misdemeanor it stands to destroy my life work, reputation and may cost the lives of 1000's of animals a year. Such tainted proof inevitably undermines the process, casting a dark shadow not only on the concept of fairness, but also on the purpose of the exercise of the coercive power of the state over the individual. No man should go free nor lose his liberty on the strength of false, misleading or incomplete proof. To date, the prosecution has violated its Constitutional obligations to the Defendant, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and other U.S. and state authorities. Prosecutors have an affirmative duty to comply with the Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure and orders from the court. That duty includes the affirmative responsibility to learn of any evidence favorable to the accused and to disclose such evidence in a timely manner so that it can be effectively used by the accused. I have repeatedly demanded discovery and the city has blatantly disregarded all requests. False, copied pasted, and shoddy evidence violates every single tenet of the laws or rules of discovery & flies in the face of defendant's constitutional rights as a natural born citizen of the United States of America. Whether the municipal court judge or city's prosecutors, believe it or not they bound by the same laws, rules and regulations as every other American. It is called the Constitution and let this be notice that the municipal court is a court of limited jurisdiction granted it's right of existence by those very same rules

The government has violated its solemn obligation and duty in this case by suppressing or withholding material proof pertinent to the credibility of its complaining witnesses and other information previously requested by Defendant. This includes all information in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to: (a) exculpate the Defendant; (b) adversely impact the credibility of prosecutor’s witnesses or evidence; (c) mitigate the offense; or (d) mitigate punishment. The Supreme Court’s directed that a criminal trial is a search for the truth. This case is troubling in its failure to produce exculpatory evidence in violation of the law. In particular the following discovery I requested some 15 to 20 times before trial and never received. Generally speaking, those ethical and professional obligations do not hinge on whether the information to be provided to defendants may be said to be “material” in any sense. Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Model Rules”) states that a prosecutor shall “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.” Although the Model Rules serve as guidance only, almost every state has adopted enforceable rules of professional conduct that are identical to or based upon the Model Rules. Failure of a prosecutor to abide by applicable ethical rules can result in a range of sanctions, including, in particularly egregious circumstances, disbarment. The government has what is sometimes referred to as a “Super-Brady” obligation to disclose information “beyond that which is ‘material’ to guilt

as articulated in Kyles v. Whitley (citations omitted)… and Strickler v. Greene (citations omitted). The government must disclose “information that is inconsistent with any element of any crime charged against the defendant or that establishes a recognized affirmative defense, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes such information will make the difference between conviction and acquittal of the defendant for a charged crime. This also requires disclosure of information that either casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any evidence — including but not limited to witness testimony — the prosecutor intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime charged, or might have a significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 - Supreme Court 1963 373 U.S. 83 (1963) No. 490. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 18-19, 1963. Decided May 13, 1963. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. This ruling is an extension of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112, where the Court ruled on what nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due process: "It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215-216, we phrased the rule in broader terms: "Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103." The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain To the convict and punish a person through the inflence of prejudice and caprice is as pernicious in it's consequences as the escape of a guilty man Lime v. Ok 1 Rider cites to three cases to support his impermissible poverty inference argument. State v. Matthews, 75 Wn. App. 278, 284, 877 P.2d 252 (1994); State v.Suttle, 61 Wn. App. 703, 812 P.2d 119 (1991); State v. Newton, 42 Wn. App. 718, 724, 714 P.2d 684 (1986).

Defendant's requested that the city disclose “information that is inconsistent with any element of any crime charged against the Defendant or that establishes a recognized affirmative defense, regardless of whether the prosecutor believed such information will make the difference between conviction and acquittal of the Defendant for a charged crime. I was denied a hearing on the credibility of Rose Adams who has numerous charges of crimes of dishonesty & is currently under investigation for animal cruelty for beating her 2 dangerous pitbulls with a bat when she once again allowed them together to fight eachother. Rule CrRLJ 4.7 Discovery (a) Prosecuting Authority's Obligations. (1)(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (2) (3) (4) Spinelli V United States Defendant also filed a request for admissions, and an Affidavit of Truth which went unanswered, and unrebutted well before time for trial. To further prove my claim on March 2^nd 2012 I finally got a letter from the City of Everett Clerks telling me that some of my discovery was ready but the rest wouldn't be available til later, 35 days ATER court & even then they denied me access to most of what I requested (See Exhibits 20 to 20-f)

13) There is also the matter of Judge Mitchell pronouncing me guilty at the custody hearing on April, 21^st, 2011, where he stated in an open court “You abused your animals so I think that the City of Everett Shelter knows what's best for them” which is recorded and memorialized for the courts to hear. When I demanded to know if he has already convicted and pronounced guilty he refused to answer me, but his statement and then his silence spoke his answer immeasurably. These are considered extra judicial comments & he is not allowed to make them, they show his bias in my case & he should've IMMEDIATELY recused himself from my case as soon as those words came out of his mouth. During a Motion to represent myself Pro Se, the sitting Judge said "The Supreme Court seems to think you have the right to defend yourself, we here in Everett don't think so" The Judge should refrain from making any comments that undermine the confidence in the Judicial system as a whole During a Discovery Hearing the Judge made this statement: "I thought all of the lab results say that all of the animals were in horrible condition" Not significant in itself, but the hearing was for the discovery of the lab results themselves showing that he was having Ex Parte Communication with the prosecutor, because we don't even have the lab results. It also shows bias in that the Judge has a pre-formed opinion about the health safety & welfare of the animals 3.8Code Of Judicial Conduct (CJC) Preamble[1] [2] Code Of Judicial Conduct (CJC) Scope[2] [4] [5] [6]

As a final insult the prosecutor asked for 5 days in jail, the Judge went on a rampage, calling me numerous names, degrading and humiliating me, making psychological evaluations about defendants mental capacity, as well as accusing defendant of being a pathological liar. If I was not used to being regularly abused by Judge Mitchell I might have actually cried. The judge ordered me to serve 25 days in jail and refused to hear the my stay of judgment, exceeding the prosecutor's recommendation 5 times over, showing extreme prejudice. (See Exhibits 21)

At one point I was 8 minutes late for court and Judge Mitchell entered a warrant for my arrest even though I had called in to say I was going to be late, but only after making me wait for most of the day to tell her me was going to have a warrant, unless of course they can show they issue warrants for everyone who is 8 minutes late for court again showing malicious intent. (See Exhibit 22 & 22-a) The Officer who I turned myself into and the Snohomish County correctional Officers said they had never seen such a high bail for something like this, he apologized to me all the way to the jail as did the Correctional Officers, and said it was 5 times higher than the fines were in violation of excessive bails & fines.

The 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted Const. art. 1, § 14 states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted

The Judge also refused to let me defend myself until 1 week before trial an refused to give me time to prepare for trial, at that hearing Judge Mitchell struck a hearing for discovery and additional motions so he prevented defendant from any defense what so ever He also canceled the discovery hearing the day before trial even though I called in and asked for them to reinstate the hearing they refused, so I was never allowed to rebut or enter evidence in my trial.

14) There is also the strange matter of if my charge is a criminal charge or citation, if it is a criminal charge there is no designation for it at the Snohomish County Jail. If in fact this is merely a citation then I never should have had my animals taken or been to trial. In looking to the codes no where can I find a clear & concise language in the code.

EMC 6:04 C.(2) Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty as defined in RCW 16.52.205, fail to provide an animal with sufficient good and wholesome food and a constant source of clear potable water, proper shelter and protection from the weather, veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering, and with humane care and treatment;

The language itself is ambiguous & creates confusion for a citizen not versed or educated in law. Because a)I was not allowed a pretrial hearing to dispute any of the prosecutions evidence, or b) to be informed about their witnesses nor c) be allowed to interview any of them or know the nature of their testimony, nor d) to write my own jury instructions, nor e) to enter any of my own evidence or supporting documents, nor f) allowed to have an expert witness, nor were any of my witnesses subpeonaed

15) I was never allowed to build a defense, which is my Constitutionally guaranteed right as a “defendant” but if I am reading the statute in plain language it seems to me that all of the elements of the crime must be proven. The language piles all of the elements together as if all of the conditions must be met, it does not say or, it says and and and throughout the whole paragraph. So does this mean that I am supposed to prove or disprove all of the elements or just a select few. I had $70.00 bags of dry dog food in the car & $40.00 cases of wet food. We were in a sheltered car above ground able to be turned off & on so that we had heat so that it wouldn't get too cold, my animals had more clothes then I did in the car if needed, the water container was on top of the car because they couldn't drink while they slept, the city ordered vet records from almost all of our prior vets so had access to up to 7 years of vet records which clearly show the dogs were receiving veterinary care along with the medicine that was seized at the same time as the animals were: Those elements are straightforward, easily understandable, but the last statement which is what I was charged with humane care & treatment... What does that mean? At no time was I ever given any statements which would describe the exact nature of the charge(s) against me & at no time have I ever been sure if I was supposed to prove all of the elements or some of the elements. Or even more confusing does Humane Care encompass all of the prior mentions? If it is separate from vet care, food water, shelter, then I submit it void for vagueness The due process doctrine of "void for vagueness" has two central principles. First, criminality must be defined with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice concerning conduct they must avoid. And second, legislated crimes must not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement

"To be consistent with due process, a penal statute or ordinance must contain ascertainable standards of guilt, so that men of reasonable understanding are not required to guess at the meaning of the enactment."- in State V Smith. Second, the statute must contain ascertainable standards for adjudication so that police, judges, and juries are not free to decide what is prohibited and what is not, depending on the facts in each particular case.- in State v. Foster, 1979

Everett Municipal Code 6.04.070 Prohibited conduct.
C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to:
(2) Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty as defined in RCW 16.52.205, fail to provide an animal with sufficient good and wholesome food and a constant source of clear potable water, proper shelter and protection from the weather, veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering, and with humane care and treatment;

The worst part is trying to decipher what this “Humane Care” entails, it is a mystery, if in fact the code said Failure to provide humane care as described below or above, then it would be easy to ascertain that food shelter & vet care provisions gave a definite description but it does not: It defines food water, shelter, vet care & then adds “Failure to Provide Humane Care” as a separate entity of it's own. (See Exhibits 23 to 23-b)

I am a Vegetarian, to me it is IN-humane to cut an animals throat & let it bleed to death & then to salivate over it's cooking remains, I still will not go into another persons fridge or freezer only to see the frozen remains of what was once a living breathing feeling sentient emotional being, to some it is IN-humane to leave a dog outside, but some who do, love their dogs just the same, to me it is IN-humane to not allow my dogs on the furniture, hence the reason is is called “fur”niture. Others would never dream of letting their dog sleep with them or sit on their couch, my dogs have their own couch. Some consider raw feeding IN-humane some consider any type of packaged dog food IN-humane & cook for their own animals. Some folks consider it IN-humane to leave a dog out in the back yard all day long while at work, others think it is Humane to use a dog to hunt with while some consider that a double In-humanity. To some ear & tail docking is IN-humane but to others it is beautiful. While I understand the need to protect animals, even more so as an animal rescuer, I have seen things no one should ever have to, but there has got to be a very clear line drawn at laws that destroy our Constitutional Freedoms & Rights. In my case I was sleeping/living with my animals in a car for almost 3 weeks, (17days) (See Exhibit 26) knowing it was only a temporary situation because most were senior, instead of dumping them at a shelter to be euthanized, that in my mind is IN-humane. To me these are my children with four legs fur & a speech impediment, they mean as much to me as any human being, would the courts consider it more humane to dump your children because you were temporarily homeless to be killled?

16) This is not a story that begins on January 6^th 2011 by any means, it spans over a decade with Ms Trask, or Lemaire, or Carlon or Staib depending on which year I had to deal with her: In 2001 I moved into the city of Everett with 1 pit bull terrier, at which time, my family, children, and myself were harassed mercilessly, to the point that I had to call the Everett Police after City of Everett Animal Control Officer Ms Trask walked into my house without knocking or without a warrant and attempted to grab one of the pitbull terriers. I made the heart-wrenching decision to give the dogs away for their own safety as I was sure that one day I would come home from work and they would be gone. Shortly thereafter I moved from the City. In 2009 I was realizing my dream of starting an animal rescue, and first in line was my dream of rescuing the pit bull Terriers from Everett Animal Services. Years prior I would go sit with the Pit Bull Terriers that I knew were going to be euthanized and sit by their kennels to give them love and human kindness before they were euthanized, promising one day I'd find a way to save them. After receiving many dogs a disturbing trend emerged, all of the dogs were injured, maced or both. After complaining about it, my pulling privileges were suspended without reason, except that one of the animal control officers had complained about the accusations. (See Exhibits 24 to 24-j) Triggering Whistleblower. It should be noted that Mr Fisher the city of Everett prosecutor made a statement claiming that I pulled these dogs using fraud at trial which is technically accusing me of committing a crime I had not been charged with or convicted of while doing my job which is slander as legally defined. He also filed a false complaint against me with the Snohomish County Animal Control telling them I had 20+ animals in my daughter's home in feces encrusted cages, which he knew not to be true. (See Exhibit 27 & 27a) It is also the second time the city accused me of crimes I was not being charged with & that I was not guilty of. When I demanded very loudly to know if he was accusing me of a crime, & if he was charging me all I got was dead silence. Amongst the many other crimes he accused me of in the entire process of this matter.

17) It would seem that the prosecutor has nothing to do but scan my on-line blog & web pages & file an arbitrary Motion in Limine, (See Exhibits 25 to 25c) since it seems to be such a focus of the Prosecution. It would seem that the court may have nothing better to do than to file frivolous Motions as evidenced by the prosecutions Motion in Limine by scanning Defendants on line blog, we submit that if the charges are not dismissed that the whole blog be admitted into evidence, not just parts which have been taken out of context. Defendant stated she had offers from over 169 people to come to court, several days after she narrowed it down to 23 witnesses, several days later the prosecutor issued a Motion in Limine requesting she produce 169 people and parade each witness in front of the court in the interest of brevity so as not to waste the courts valuable time (HUH?) Again we are bordering on what looks like malicious prosecution. It can be shown that the City of Everett spends 20 to 70 hours a week, some evenings and weekends as well parked on Ms Taamu's web page and Ms Taamu's blog, at a cost to taxpayers of 2400.00 to 5600.00 per week and this has been a 40 week ordeal. Ms Taamu as trackers on both sites which record all visits, length, duration and navigational paths as well. If in fact portions of the blogs or webpages were submitted the whole of it's contents should've also been admitted. Rule er 106 remainder of or related writings or recorded statements

18) Constitutional disparities in the everett municipal codes and conflicts with state law (See side by side Analysis)

19) After trial I watched as some of my, or the city's exhibits were thrown away but I have not had access to any of the transcripts or court records so I am not sure which it is.

20) I was incorrectly imprisoned after trial, Judge Mitchell calimed he was “on vacation” & let me sit in jail for 11 days before he heard my appeal, but at sentencing he didn't fill out the correct forms denying or asserting that I was a flight risk or a danger to the community

I would reserve the right to file a supplemental brief with the court in regards to evidence I did not have the money to print off, & have not had access to. I have had less then 17 hours to prepare this brief as it is.

Respectfully submitted this 15^th day of February in 2013

___________________________________________

Brandia Taamu- Defendant